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Abstract
Land degradation is a significant cause of biodiversity loss, food insecurity, and persistent
poverty. In this dissertation, I explore how land conservation and conversion policies affect
economic development and human welfare. I use current and historical contexts and compile
primary data sources to answer this question. I use case studies from both developing and
developed countries, and from both land conversion and working land conservation policies.
In the first chapter, I study the effects of forest protected areas (PAs) on surrounding
households in a developing country. I use Nepal’s recently established PAs as a case study to
see the effects on the households who depend on the forest. I find that PAs reduce household
wood collection, but there is no evidence that other household consumption is significantly
reduced by the strain of reduced access to forest resources nor that PAs rapidly attracted
tourism that increased household welfare in these rural villages.
This analysis of the immediate effects of land conservation policies in Nepal cannot
shed light on all the effects of conservation policies, as land and soil quality change takes
time. Historical events provide a more complete picture. Thus, my second two chapters
study historical land conservation policies in the United States (US). In my second chapter,
I explore the persistent impacts on the environment of the earliest farmland conservation
policies in the Great Plains. The 1930s Dust Bowl compelled the federal government to
undertake large soil conservation policies; I evaluate the effects of those policies over fifty
years. Results show that the Voluntary Acreage Reduction program had beneficial long-term
effects, increasing areas planted in grassland and decreasing soil erosion in areas that were
previously heavily planted in corn and wheat.
ii
Land conservation policies also include creating and nurturing local institutions for
management. In my third chapter, I study what factors affected the speed with which local
environmental institutions – the Soil Conservation Districts (SCDs) – were created to improve
farmland resource management. I use historical documents to create a dataset on exactly
when SCDs were established during the period of 1936-1956. A duration analysis of those
data finds that SCDs did rise up more rapidly in places hit hardest by crop failure, but
institutional change was slower in areas dominated by farms managed by tenants who did
not have legal authority to help create SCDs to help preserve their farms.
iii
To My Late Grandmother, Sadhana Batabyal, for ideas and words.
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Even in the current era of modern financial transactions, land is still an important
foundation of wealth and prosperity. Institutions that manage land and property, including
legal rights and rules, are some of our oldest and most dynamic institutions. Some land
institutions are permanent and widespread across the globe. However, the nature of these
institutions varies across regions and geographic scales. Scholars have long studied land
institutions, the relationship between land quality and economic development, and the effects
of land policies. Recent policy reports by Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) rank land degradation and biodiversity loss as one of the biggest
threats to humanity, and this becomes even more serious under the risk of climate change
where land conservation has been proven to be a crucial instrument for climate resilience.
Land conservation policies have been designed and implemented all over the world to
reduce land degradation and biodiversity loss. This dissertation is comprised of three intercon-
nected but distinct studies of the performance of land conservation tools in different contexts.
Altogether, the studies answer questions in a single theme: How do land conservation policies
and institutions affect economic development and how are those effects distributed among
people and across space? I use established economic theory, modern econometric techniques,
and new primary data sources to develop evidence on the impact of land conservation tools.
In the first chapter, I study the impact of protected areas on rural people. Many forest
protected areas (PAs) are located in developing countries, where forests are a significant
source of food and fuel. Thus, biodiversity conservation may reduce the welfare of people in
local communities. To explore this issue, I examine the effects of PAs in Nepal. Using the
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Nepal Living Standard Survey collected in 1995/1996 and 2003/2004, I evaluate the effects
of PAs established between 1995 and 2003 on household consumption and wood-collection.
The estimates suggest that the establishment of PAs has reduced the average forest-good
consumption by 30 to 70 percent compared to the period before PA establishment, though
this decrease has not translated into more substantial market participation in fuel purchases.
The results vary with how the PAs are managed. However, estimates regarding household
welfare suggest neither significant adverse effects from PA restrictions nor positive impacts
on households from PA-based ecotourism.
This evaluation of the effects of conservation policies in a very short period cannot
shed light on the long-run impacts of conservation because time is needed for land quality
to be restored and for some patterns of economic activity to shift. To understand the link
between land conservation and human welfare in the long run, I use the post-Dust Bowl
farmland conservation policies in the U.S. as a case study to estimate how policies changed
this landscape over a long period of time and how that affected local economic development.
The second chapter, "Recovery from the Dust Bowl: Implication of Land Conservation
Programs in the Great Plains," studies the long-term persistent impacts of historical land
conservation policies in the U.S. The 1930s American Dust Bowl compelled the federal
government to undertake the largest peacetime budgetary expansion in American history,
popularly known as the New Deal. A significant part of this policy bundle was related to
farmland conservation policies and was specially designed to restore soil-conserving grasslands
in the Great Plains. I evaluate this post-Dust Bowl farmland conservation programs to
understand the persistent and immediate impacts of incentive-dependent land conservation
policies, especially on the existence of grassland areas and soil erosion levels. Using historical
data on cropland and grassland in Great Plains counties and exploiting spatial and temporal
variation of the policy, I find positive and persistent effects of the early land conservation
policies on the future area in grassland. Also, these programs seem to reduce soil erosion
levels in pasture land in the long run. The immediate annual effects of soil conservation
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budget show the importance of federal subsidies in decision making. Spatial heterogeneity
in the impact of these conservation policies depends on agricultural land tenancy, access to
irrigation, access to credit, availability of non-farm jobs, number of farms, and size of farms.
Local institutions have long influenced the outcomes of land conservation policies.
Coordination between resource managers to manage common-pool resources (CPRs) is an
essential dimension in land conservation (Ostrom, 2009). What drives creation of local
institutions to facilitate that kind of coordination? In my third and last chapter, I use the
Soil Conservation Districts (SCDs) in the U.S. as a case study to explore CPR creation in
the USA.
The third chapter "Understanding the Formation of Local Institutions: Historical
Evidence from Soil Conservation Districts" examines the formation of local institutions in
natural resource management, especially in the context of soil conservation and climate
resilience in the post-Dust Bowl Great Plains. Post-Dust Bowl federal land conservation
policies include incentives to form local environmental institutions named SCDs to coordinate
farmers in topsoil conservation and regional natural resource management; this remains the
primary local institution working on topsoil conservation. I construct a new dataset on the
policy timing of SCDs from 1936 to 1956. I apply duration analysis methodology to those
data to examine the effects of economic and ecological factors in the speed of formation of
SCDs. I find that farm size, the number of farms, initial soil erosion intensity, the timing of
climate shock, and tenancy rate influence the pace of SCD creation.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSEQUENCES OF PROTECTED AREAS FOR
FOREST EXTRACTION AND TIME ALLOCATION:
EVIDENCE FROM NEPAL
2.1 Introduction
Protected areas (PAs)—places with legal restrictions on resource extraction—play a
pivotal role in biodiversity conservation. According to the World Database of Protected
Areas, about 15% of the world’s land is currently under some level of “protection”.1 Because
tropical developing countries are the habitat for many endangered and threatened species,
most PAs are located in poor regions of the world (Andam et al., 2008). However, households
living near forests traditionally extract and depend on resources from the landscape (e.g.,
firewood, honey, and herbal medicines). An important unintended consequence of PAs in
developing countries may be welfare loss for these households if people need to reallocate
their efforts and consumption choices after a sudden ban on resource access. This paper
therefore asks the question, how does a PA affect the forest extraction behavior and time
allocation of the surrounding people?
This paper contributes to the economic literature studying the effect of PAs on forest
livelihoods at the household level. A large body of literature spatially analyzes forest covers
to understand the impacts of Pas. However, detailed household-level analysis on firewood use
and effort allocation is not represented in the literature. In general, estimated impacts show
that PAs help protect biodiversity (Andam et al., 2008; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2011; Nelson
and Chomitz, 2011; Shah and Baylis, 2015; Sims, 2010). Using landscape-level pixel data,
1See also http://www.protectedplanet.net/.
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these papers examine the effects of PAs on deforestation and find different magnitudes of
impact in different contexts. The success of PAs in biodiversity conservation also intuitively
implies a welfare reallocation among the surrounding communities.
Environmental economists and policymakers have become concerned about whether
establishment of forest PAs causes an adverse impact on welfare or reduces poverty by
generating ecotourism activities (Adams et al., 2004; Barrett, Travis, and Dasgupta, 2011;
Baylis et al., 2016; Miteva, Pattanayak, and Ferraro, 2012; Pullin et al., 2013; Alix-Garcia
et al., 2014; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Wilkie et al., 2006, Andam et al., 2010). A growing
body of literature has analyzed regional-level poverty data to determine the impacts of PAs.
The first papers to discuss the impacts of PAs on human welfare are qualitative analyses based
on cross-sectional case-specific data (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006; Pattanayak et al.,
2003; Brandon, Redford, and Sanderson, 1998; Bookbinder et al., 1998; Foerster et al., 2011).
These studies show that PAs have diverse impacts, depending on household characteristics.
The first research that uses a careful identification strategy to determine the economic
impact of PAs on neighboring communities is a study by Andam et al. (2010). The authors
use census-tract level poverty index data from 1973 and 2000 for Costa Rica, and they use
the poverty headcount ratio at the sub-district level (share of the population with monthly
household consumption below the poverty line) from the 2000 census for Thailand. Using
a matching with difference-in-difference method, the study shows that the poverty data is
non-negatively correlated with established PAs. However, the measurement of poverty used
in the study is an average score over several decades that gives only a relative ranking of
the areas. Several other studies also find that PAs have mixed impacts on the regional-level
poverty index in different countries using similar econometric approaches (Canavire-Bacarreza
and Hanauer, 2013; Miranda et al., 2016; Sims, 2010; Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015;
Clements et al., 2014; Ferraro, Hanauer, and Sims, 2011; Pfaff et al., 2014). Given the success
of PAs on biodiversity outcomes, it becomes important to understand the household-level
effects of the PAs.
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Little work has estimated the impacts of PAs using household-level information on
firewood use and time allocation. Yergeau, Boccanfuso, and Goyette, 2017 did develop a
theoretical macro model of the effects of conservation on aggregate social welfare that includes
an agricultural productivity model. But analysis of the impacts of PAs with household-level
information is needed in order to design better policy instruments for future conservation
and follow-up compensation tools to accompany that conservation. The primary goal of
this paper is to tackle micro-level issues such as household-specific firewood uses and time
allocation to collect firewood.
This paper is grounded in household-level theoretical models. We take an explicitly
quasi-experimental approach to analyzing the changes in household activities that arise
from establishment of new PAs, and we empirically investigate the channels through which
households in villages near new PAs react to such establishment. The predictions derived
from economic theory are ambiguous. Resource restrictions associated with PAs will hamper
the daily livelihoods of forest-dependent local communities, but ecotourism driven by PAs
could increase household wellbeing by changing the local labor market and introducing new
income sources.
To examine the effects of PAs on household activities, we use data from Nepal because
that country has both newly established PAs and multiple years of detailed household-level
economic information. We use Nepal’s household survey data for the years 1995/1996 and
2003/2004. During this time span, the Nepalese government introduced several new PAs
with various management stringency. We collect detailed information about the geographical
locations of these “treatment” PAs and the villages in the household survey. We compare
household wood-collection and other activities in villages close to PAs to villages farther away
from PAs.
The ideal experiment to estimate the impacts on households would randomly assign PAs
to some communities and not to others, and then compare activities across the communities.
However, PAs are not randomly allocated across space. Forest landscapes with richer
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biodiversity may be more likely to be protected. Also, governments may choose to invest
in protecting landscapes that have better prospects for being popular tourist spots. Thus,
unobserved community characteristics (e.g., forest dependency or site selection) may be a
source of bias in OLS estimates of the effects of PA designation on household activity. Our
empirical research strategy accounts for such possible selection processes and provides causal
identification of the PA impacts. The political economy of forest management in Nepal
suggests that state-level decisions about PA siting are exogenous to individual-level choice
behavior. Thus, this paper’s strategy for identifying PA impacts relies on the fact that a
household’s exposure to PAs varies with time and region. We use a difference-in-difference
(DID) estimator that controls for systematic variation of the presence of a ban on resource
access over time and across regions.
To evaluate the impacts of PAs and to understand thoroughly the potential bias arising
from the non-random setting, we carry out the analysis with three different control groups.
First, a control group of forest communities not near any PAs established during our study
period forms our primary basis for comparison. Second, we use a control group of villages near
PAs that were established prior to the study period. Third, we use another control group of
villages located near PAs that were established after the study period. These “treated earlier”
and “treated later” villages may be more similar in unobserved characteristics to villages that
are treated during our study period than villages that are never near a protected area. We
inspect a district-level welfare variable over time to confirm similarity of the pre-treatment
welfare trends in the treatment and main control group.
We find evidence of a significant reduction in the amount of firewood collected near
PAs. Our estimates suggest that between 1996 and 2003, households’ firewood collection
decreased by almost 30 to 70 percent per day in areas close to PAs. However, the decreased
collection of forest goods does not translate to a significantly larger participation in markets
for wood substitutes. Our second set of results focuses on the per-capita total consumption.
In contrast to previous research, we do not find evidence to suggest that the ecotourism
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industry significantly changed any outcomes, at least, during the study period. However,
the short span of our study period may hinder identification of any positive effects from
ecotourism.
A complete understanding of the impacts of PAs also requires an analysis of the market
and non-market channels through which households may react to a PA; we study three
possible channels. Households may choose to migrate if household income falls below a
certain level. The shadow wage of extraction effort may induce the households to change
to alternative fuels. Also, households may do more to organize community forests as an
alternative source of firewood. We find that while the establishment of PAs appears to have
substantial impacts on forest-good collection behavior, it only has some positive effects on
adoption of community forest. Also, we qualitatively analyze the other possibilities and
explain the various channels from Nepal’s socioeconomic context.
2.2 Background and Data
Our choice of the case for this study is driven by the need to find a place with both
newly established PAs and multiple years of detailed household-level economic information.
Traditional forest dependency, establishment of new PAs in recent years, and detailed
household-specific forestry information in the Nepal Living Standard Survey make Nepal a
good choice. According to census data (2011), 78% of Nepal’s people directly depend on forest
resources. Nearly two-thirds of the Nepalese people still use firewood as a primary source of
cooking fuel. The establishment of PAs has the potential to alter this forest dependency by
reducing the size of the forest available for extraction.
2.2.1 History of Land Conservation in Nepal
Prior to 1950, forests were under the control of local communities. In 1957, the
government nationalized forest land, which created open access resources and exacerbated
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degradation because of ineffective and corrupt governance. In 1967, Nepal introduced a
special forest protection act to enable forest conservation.
Today, Nepal has a complex structure of different levels of protection, although the
forest cover loss is still very high in some areas. Nepalese forest cover declined at an annual
rate of 2.7% between 1947 and 1990 and then at an annual rate of 1.23% between 1990 and
2010. Since 1973, Nepal has established twenty PAs (comprised of ten national parks, three
wildlife reserves, six conservation areas, and one hunting reserve. Together, those PAs cover
18% of the country’s land. The Nepalese government began to engage the army in national
park management in 1975. The Royal Nepalese Army is responsible for guarding the national
parks and enforcing the regulations (Allendorf, 2007). Thus, there is meaningful enforcement
of conservation (Yergeau, Boccanfuso, and Goyette, 2017; Heinen and Shrestha, 2006).
However, continuous degradation around PAs forced the Nepalese government to arrange
a new system in 1996: the Buffer Zone Forest Management system. Buffer zone is the
surrounding area around the core park to integrate conservation and development. Buffer
zone integrates certain need of the local people, but it does not involve communities in
management of PAs (Bajracharya, 2004). In a related policy the government has, since
the late 1980’s, gradually handed national forests over to local communities based on forest
management plans devised by the District Forest Office and the local population. Any
forest-using community can apply for a parcel of forest land in exchange for a promise to
reinvest 30–40% of the revenue in the resulting community forest (CF) every year. The
concept of BZCF was created as an incentive to create community forest around buffer zones.
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) divides PAs into six
categories with respect to management objectives.2 During the period 1996–2003, Nepal
added three new PAs in IUCN categories I–IV (NPs and CAs) and six new PAs in IUCN
category 6 (BZs). Aside from these PAs, all other forest land falls under the National Forest
2Category I includes strict nature reserves and wilderness areas, Category II includes national parks,
Category III includes natural monuments and natural landmarks, Category IV includes wildlife reserves and
wildlife sanctuaries, Category V includes protected landscapes/seascapes, and Category VI includes managed
resource protected areas.
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System. Community and leasehold forestry areas are also included in the National Forest
System. Figure 1 shows a map of the PAs in Nepal, with treatment areas indicated, and
Table 1 presents information about the current structure of PAs in Nepal.
2.2.2 Nepal Living Standard Survey
To analyze the impacts of these PAs on welfare and resource collection, we use the Nepal
Living Standard Survey (NLSS) collected by the Nepalese government with the assistance
of the World Bank. In its construction, this dataset is similar to the well-known Living
Standard and Measurement Survey collected by the World Bank. The dataset is nationally
representative and has detailed information on the collection of goods from forests, including
the time spent on collection, the amount collected, and the types of the forests. NLSS also
includes a community survey.
Basic data is collected for each individual in the household. In this study, we focus on
only rural Nepal, as the forest-goods demand structure is different in urban areas (Baland
et al., 2010). We use the first two waves of the NLSS, collected in 1995/1996 and 2003/2004.
NLSS-1’s sample frame was taken from the 1991 census, and NLSS-2’s sample frame was
taken from the 2001 census. NLSS-1 and -2 follow the same survey stratification: they divide
Nepal into ecological zones of mountains, hills, and low land. The probability sampling units
(village wards) were selected from those ecological zones. We use NLSS-provided sampling
weights whenever necessary in the analysis. In total, NLSS-1 interviewed 3388 households
and NLSS-2 interviewed 3912 households. NLSS has both repeated cross-section and panel
data. As the number of households in the panel is small (though nationally representative),
we utilize it only for a robustness check for the repeated cross-sectional analysis. Nepal CBS
provides some other household-level datasets including NLSS-3 collected in 2010, but the
change in sampling strategy prohibited us from using those.
We use other datasets to obtain control variables. Information on PA establishment and
the number of species was collected from the World Database on Protected Areas (2011) and
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Nepal Biodiversity Strategy (2002). Tourism statistics were taken from the Nepal Tourism
Statistics (Statistics, 2014).
2.3 Conceptual Framework
We develop hypotheses regarding the effects of PAs on household behavior (wood
collected and time spent on wood collection) and total consumption expenditure by drawing
on household models in previous research. Several researchers have developed household
utility models of forest resource users in developing countries (Bardhan and Udry, 1999;
Albers and Robinson, 2007, Albers and Robinson, 2015). We draw primarily on a simple
model from Bode et al., 2015 that is particularly relevant to our empirical questions in which
households maximize utility by making three types of choices. Households divide their time
between gathering a resource (in our case, wood) from a forest and working for wages. They
choose exactly where in the forest to go to collect wood in order to minimize the time cost
of gathering a given amount of wood. And they spend their wage earnings on a substitute
for the forest good or a bundle of other goods such as food. Households take market prices,
wage rates, and the spatial distribution of forest resources as given. Additionally, the path
that households can take in the forest may be constrained by the presence of PAs, causing
the minimum time needed to gather a given quantity of wood to increase for all quantities.
The model in Bode et al., 2015 generates several testable hypotheses regarding the
effects of a newly established PA, assuming wages and prices remain constant. Specifically,
the model predicts that a new PA will cause households to gather less wood from the forest,
to consume less wood in total, and to have lower utility overall.
In the model of Bode et al., 2015 with a well-functioning market for wood alternatives,
households will increase purchases of those alternatives in response to a new PA. However,
that result may not hold in rural Nepal where markets for forest goods and wood alternatives
are limited; fewer than 2% of households use anything other than firewood in our data. The
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impact of a PA on time spent gathering wood is theoretically ambiguous in the model of
Bode et al. (2014) itself, because the household will choose to gather less wood, but the time
needed to gather any particular amount of wood is greater. This paper will shed light on
whether PAs in Nepal increase or decrease time spent gathering wood and market purchases
of other fuels.
New PAs in Nepal take two different forms. National Parks (NPs) or Conservation
Areas (CAs) are under IUCN category 1 and 2 and are stringently protected. A second type
of new PA is called a buffer zone (BZ) which is established around previously protected
NPs. BZs are less stringently protected under IUCN 6 category; some income generating
activities are allowed in them (Budhathoki, 2004). We hypothesize that the impact of a BZ
on firewood collection is smaller than the impact of a NP because BZs are less restrictive.
We also hypothesize that establishment of a BZ will have a less negative effect on household
welfare than a NP because of the income associated with BZs; indeed, the impact of a BZ on
welfare could even be positive.
The impact of PAs on income, consumption, and other welfare indicators depends on the
capacity of the local economy to adjust and cannot be predicted from theory. This theoretical
ambiguity means empirical analysis is needed to understand the effect of protected areas on
households. The main target of the empirical section is to estimate treatment impacts of
PA, where changes in forest good collection and other outcomes will be estimated for the
communities living around newly established PAs.
2.4 Estimation and Identification Strategy
In this study, we use a DID approach exploiting two sources of variations in order to
construct sound estimates of the counterfactual outcomes: the distance from each household
to the nearest PA and changes in the outcome variables over time. There are two key
parameters of interest: the effect of PAs on the quantity of wood collected and the time spent
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on collection, and the effect of PAs on consumption expenditures. This section explains our
strategy for generating plausible estimates of these causal effects.
2.4.1 Empirical framework
The unit of observation is a household. Our main outcome variables of interest are the
amount of firewood collected, the time spent collecting firewood, and per-capita consumption
expenditures. Firewood is the most commonly used forest good in rural Nepal.
The main independent variable is a policy indicator that equals one if the household is
near any newly established PA and zero otherwise. In our main analyses, we define “near” as
“within 20 kilometers” .3 NLSS data is not geocoded, so we use the names of the villages
to map them with PAs, using the distance from each village to the border of the nearest
PA. The treatment group consists of 372 households in 1995/1996 and 540 households in
2003/2004. In robustness checks we change the definition of proximity to PAs to see how
that affects the results.
Using the potential outcome framework, our empirical strategy is to compare changes in
outcomes in regions with newly established PAs to changes in outcomes in other areas where
similar types of forest livelihood exist. The basic regression framework we use is the standard
form of DID regression, following Imbens & Wooldridge (2009) and Angrist & Pischke (2015):
Yist = α+ βDs + δPostt + ρ (Dst) + γXist + εist (2.1)
where i indexes the individual, s indexes the group (treated village), and t indexes time.
Ds is the treatment dummy and is equal to one if a household is in a village s that is in
the treatment group. Postt equals one if an observation is in the after-treatment period and
zero otherwise. The policy dummy, (Dst) , is an interaction of the treatment dummy and
the post-period dummy, and is equal to one if a household is in a village s that is in the
treatment group after the establishment of a new PA. The impact coefficient, ρ , will capture
3One caveat is that this area may also capture other market/non-market spillovers associated with PAs
(e.g., switching to alternative fuel, migration, and so forth). We examine these points in more detail in a later
section.
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the impact of PAs.
The vector of covariates is Xist . In our preferred specification, this will include the
other important household- and village-level variables that can have effect on the outcomes:
household head’s education level and age, the household size, the value of the household
assets, the number of households in the village. We also control for the ecological belt of the
country (hill, mountain, or low land) in case that is correlated with unobservable factors.
The main empirical challenge is to find a suitable counterfactual - a measure of what
would have happened to the households if they had not been subjected to a nearby PA.
To identify the counterfactual, we need communities near forests that are comparable to
the treatment group in the covariates. Matching with observed covariates cannot solve the
problem, as “forest dependency” and “PA site/location choice criteria” are not observed
in the dataset. To reduce the bias potentially introduced by these unobservable differences
in forest livelihood across the treated and untreated group, we construct three separate
control groups that face different level of bias. We construct first control group of households
(designated as control group A) who live near a forest, but not near any kind of PA. To
determine the distance from the forest, we use the NLSS community survey question for
“distance to forest” , where the distance is measured in units of time in hours. We define
control group A as living at most six hours one way from a forest. We exclude from control
group A all households that lived around any PA established before December 2017, and
households in control group A are at least 40 km away from all PAs. Control group A consists
of 276 households in 1996 and 660 households in 2003. Distance is self-reported by the village
head and therefore might include a measurement error.
Another concern is site selection bias (Allcott, 2015). Control group A described above
may have a flatter trend of wood collection than the communities living around the treatment
PAs if we suspect that PAs have been preferentially established in areas where firewood
collection has been increasing more rapidly than the areas around non-PA forests. Another
possible source of bias is that people might be reluctant to report the actual quantities of
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firewood collection in the survey, if they know that they are not supposed to be collecting
in the park. They may know the patrolling schedule too and can just steal otherwise
(Bajracharya, 2004). Such unobserved difference would yield overestimates of the impacts.
To evaluate robustness to such potential bias, we use two other control groups. Control group
B is comprised of households that are at least 20 km away from any PA established before
1995. We exclude the PAs established before 1995 that were extended to BZs during the
study period. Villages in areas near previously established PAs may have similar features to
areas near our treatment PAs.
We also use a third control group of people living near PAs established after the study
period (in December 2009 and January 2010) designated by control group C. A comparison
of the results obtained using these three control groups can yield bounds on the treatment
effect if the conventional adjustments in pre-treatment covariates fail to remove all bias
(Rosenbaum, 1987; Meyer, 1995) and if we suspect the presence of differential trends between
the treatment and control groups. The construction of three control groups is summarized in
Table-2.
Recall that Nepal has different categories of PAs. We divide these into two groups: one
for CAs and NPs and another one only for BZs. We merge CAs and NPs together into a
status designated NP because both of these have similar strict protection and villagers face
same constraints from them. To understand the different impacts of these types of PAs, we
use a multiple-group DID regression framework, which is a slight modification of equation
(1):
Yist = α+ δPostt + β1BZi + β2NPs + ρ1 (BZs ∗ Postt) + ρ2 (NPst) + γXist + εist (2.2)
BZ is equal to one if the household is in a village that is near a BZ and zero otherwise,
and NP is equal to one if the household is in a village that is near a NP or CA and zero
otherwise. Following the conceptual framework, we expect that ρ1 and ρ2 will be negative for
the fuelwood collection dependent variable.
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2.4.2 Identifying Assumptions
At a minimum, we need unconfoundedness to establish causality. Given our assumption
that the treatment effect does not vary over households, unconfoundedness, or the conditional
independence assumption, is equivalent to independence of the treatment assignment and
error, conditional on covariates. Violation of this assumption is empirically not testable. We
therefore employ two indirect strategies. First, we estimate the causal effect on a treatment
group that is known not to have any effect from new PAs in the study period. We use the
households near the PAs established before out study period (before 1996). We also use the
households near the four PAs that were established in the period 2009–2010, long after our
study period. These “false” or experimental treatment groups should not show any impact
during the study period (1996–2003). Second, we check the causal effect on variables known
to be unaffected by PAs. First, we use agricultural income derived from crop sale revenues
and input expenditures. However, agricultural income might also be affected by the treatment
through productivity shock.
We also need a stronger assumption than unconfoundedness. The DID result can be
interpreted as the causal effect of PAs only under the assumption that in the absence of a PA
the increase in outcomes would not be systematically different in these two groups. In other
words, there need to be parallel trends in the outcome variables. Unfortunately, Nepal does
not provide any national household-level data prior to 1996. The Demography and Health
Survey 1987 is the only pre-1995 household survey provided by the Nepal Central Bureau
of Statistics, but this is only a focus group study. Moreover, the Demography and Health
Survey 1995 does not provide any geographic information owing to privacy concerns. In the
absence of any pre-baseline data, it is impossible for us to check the parallel trend assumption
by gathering data for a longer period.
However, to develop some intuitive evidence regarding whether trends in conditions in
those villages are parallel to each other, we look at three sets of data over time. First, we
employ the lifestyle data from the community questionnaire. NLSS asks the community head
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whether the village has been on an upward welfare trend over the last five years. In 1996,
86% of the control group and 88% of the treatment group confirmed that their village was
in an upward trend. In 2003, these numbers went down to 68% and 71% for the control
and treatment groups, respectively, because of the nationwide economic crisis. Although
this welfare trend is a self-reported qualitative measurement, the similarity between the
treatment and control groups by time shows a similar trend for welfare. Second, we present
the district-level human development index in Figure 3 to obtain a crude idea about the
pre-treatment welfare trend. Comparing with control group A, we see that HDI shows a
similar trend in the pre-treatment period.
The next requirement for a valid DID analysis is that the support for the distribution
of the conditioning covariates in the treatment group should overlap with the support for
the distribution of these covariates in the comparison group. Table 3 and Table 4 present
the covariate balance at the village level and at the household level for control group A.
Economic theory helps us classify which variables need to be balanced, based on their role in
the theoretical model of household behavior. The model says that a household’s treatment
status and corresponding reaction depend on the distance to a forest, household size, and
household-specific demographic characteristics and asset levels. As PA site selection may
depend on the possibility of revenue generation, we can proxy for it with variables such as
distance to market, slope, and population size. Table 5 and Table 6 show covariate balance
at the village level and at the household-level for control group B. We see that the treatment
group was always collecting more firewood than the control groups during the pre-treatment
period, which indicates that the PA community always had a higher level of collection than
the control groups. Nepal is geographically very dispersed, which makes the district-level
maximum elevation factor imbalanced in Table 3. However, as a robustness check, we run an
analysis in which the mean elevation is balanced.
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2.5 Results
In this section, we present the results of our average treatment effect estimates from
regression equations (2.1) and (2.2) and of a series of robustness and placebo tests.
We begin by estimating a specification equivalent to regression equation (1) for the actual
experiment and a placebo experiments by using repeated cross-section data. As the sampling
procedure is exogenous, regression estimates are not weighted using sampling weight (Solon,
Haider, and Wooldridge, 2015). Table 7 presents the results. Recall that the coefficients for
the policy variable (post∗ treatment) are the impacts of PAs on the surrounding households.
Column 1 shows that proximity to PAs causes average firewood collection to decrease by
0.096 bhari per day (a bhari is a basket that people can carry on their backs, supported by a
brace). Columns 2 and 3 show that there is no significant average treatment effect on per
capita consumption expenditures or time spent collecting firewood.
As discussed above, this control group may produce biased results, as these households do
not live around any PA. Thus, we evaluate the sensitivity of the results to alternative control
groups in Table 8. One other control group of households lives around PAs established before
the study period (control group B). The treatment impact shows similar signs and a somewhat
larger effect. For this alternative control group, per-day firewood collection decreases by 0.138
bhari. For the third control group who live near protected areas established in 2009/2010
(control group C), per-day firewood collection decreases by 0.128 bhari. From these results, it
appears that comparing treatment PA communities to non-PA forest communities does not
overestimate the impacts.
We have a natural “placebo” experimental group of households living near PAs that
were established in 2009 and 2010. This placebo treatment group should not have any change
in firewood collection behavior during the study period as those PAs were placed after the
study period4. As expected, this placebo treatment group shows no significant change in
firewood collection, as can be seen in Table 9. These placebo treatment villages are more
4This placebo treatment group is Control Group C in the main analysis.
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likely to have the same trend as our treatment group had established earlier. The impact in
this placebo treatment group is negligible, showing that the average treatment effect we find
in the actual treatment group is not only due to a differential trend; otherwise, we would
also see a significant non-zero impact for this placebo treatment group.
We can now estimate the impacts of different protection intensities with regression
equation (2). Table 10 presents the results using the households in control group A that are
not near any PAs. The strict PAs (NP/CA) are estimated to reduce firewood collection by
0.162 bhari per day. In contrast, the estimated impact of BZ areas on firewood collection
is not statistically significant. The estimates show that neither NP/CA nor BZ areas have
statistically significant effects on per capita expenditure or time spent collecting firewood.
Using control group B and C, those living around previously established PAs, we find
coefficients with slightly different magnitudes but similar signs, as shown in Table 11 and Table
12. Strict PAs are estimated to reduce wood collection by 0.204 bhari per day. Interestingly,
using the second control group, we find a statistically significant treatment effect of BZs on
firewood collection though that impact is smaller than NPs in magnitude with a reduction
in collection of 0.119 bhari per day. Again, PA establishment has no significant impact on
collection time and expenditure using control group B. Comparing the treatment group with
these three control groups, we see that the impact of PAs on firewood collection varies in the
range of 30% to 70% , depending on the nature of the PA.
We run regressions of equation (2.2) using a placebo outcome variable: agricultural
revenue. As expected, the results shown in Tables 10, 11 and 12 indicate that PAs do not
have any effect on this variable.
We also investigate the robustness of the preceding results to a number of alternative
specifications. Table 13 presents the robustness across geographic variations. First, on the
premise that low lands may have different firewood demands than hills/mountains (Baland
et al., 2010), we estimate regression Equation 2 after dropping low land areas (Panel A). In
Panel B, we estimate the results after balancing the mean elevation of the treatment and
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control groups. Extreme elevations have been removed from this analysis. Overall, the results
are quite robust. Table 14 presents the result of changing the definition of the treatment to a
proximity of 10 km to a PA. For strict PAs, this does not show any significant changes in the
results. However, contrary to the previous results, BZs now also have a significant negative
impact on average firewood collection. This shows that within a closer area, establishment of
BZs also has negative impacts like those of strict PAs.
To complement this analysis of repeated cross-section data, we estimate Equation (1)
on the NLSS panel data with 84 observations for the treatment group and 84 for the control
group. The results in Table-16 show a similar pattern to the repeated cross-section results.
However, only 30 households in this panel live near strict PAs, which prevents us from
estimating Equation 2. This result is presented in Table 15 and Table 16.
It is important to evaluate the magnitude of the PAs’ effects. The unit of measurement
for firewood collection is the bhari, which is a Nepalese local measurement unit. We can
convert bhari to kilograms using conversion rates available in NLSS. On average, one bhari
equals 33.28 kg. From different specifications, a simple calculation predicts 3 kg to 7 kg less
firewood collection per day by an average household near a PA. This equals a 30% to 70%
decline from pre-treatment firewood collection. On average, these villages have around 150
households, so an average village collects at least 450 kg less firewood every day because of
the PA.
2.6 Mechanisms and Discussion
In theory, several factors could influence the statistical relationship between the outcome
variables and the establishment of PAs: migration and remittance income may mitigate the
impacts of PAs on welfare, formation of community forests may influence the effects of PAs by
providing alternative fuel source, and the local labor market may affect the causal relationship
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between PAs and outcomes by changing the income opportunities. In this section, we test for
these mechanisms. Table 17 presents the results.
First, the establishment of PAs could cause increased out-migration near PAs, and
migration might be an important pathway for improving welfare outcomes because migration
helps to reduce the impacts from any negative shock. To check this, we test for whether
PAs increase out-migration from the villages near them. We also test whether incoming
remittance increases in villages near PAs. Table 17 shows that PAs do not have any effect on
remittance and number of migrants. We also test for whether PAs affect labor supply and
unemployment, and we find very small and mostly insignificant results.
Second, the impacts of PAs on forest-good consumption might be influenced by access
to a community forest (CF). The Nepalese government will give any group of people living
near a forest the right to form a CF if they apply to the district-level administration. If there
is a systematic spatial correlation between the formation of a CF group and establishment of
a PA, and people near new PAs are more inclined to form CFs, then the access to CFs is
likely to make people better off and reduce the negative impacts of PAs (Ostrom, 2008).
NLSS only asks the village head whether the village has any CF. This information is
not useful, as it may happen that a village has more than one CF and some households may
still not be members of any of them. Therefore, we indirectly test this possibility by using
the location of firewood collection, which is a close proxy of “membership in a CF”. NLSS
divides forest land for collecting firewood into government forests and CFs. If a household
is collecting resources from a CF, then it is definitely a member of a CF, for otherwise it
would not have the access to the CF (Baland et al., 2010). We create a binary dummy
for whether a household uses a CF. Column 4 of Table 17 shows that there is a significant
positive probability near a BZ of changing the place of collection from a government forest
to a CF. People near strict PAs do not have any significant inclination to use CFs. This
may happen for two reasons. First, people near newly established strict PAs may take more
time to form a CF, which may affect the bureaucratic process of forming a CF. Second, the
21
compensation mechanism near a BZ may include a CF clause. However, NLSS does not have
detailed information to test these hypotheses.
Finally, we run a regression of factors influencing the household’s choice of stove to
explore whether a PA induces households shift to more energy efficient stoves. More than
95% of Nepal’s rural people use either mud stoves or open fireplaces. Though both these
types of stoves use firewood to produce energy, a mud stove is environmentally more efficient.
We use a binary variable for the households’ stove choice equal to 1 if the household uses a
mud stove and zero otherwise. Column 5 of Table 17 indicates that PA establishment has no
causal effect on stove choice, suggesting that the effect of PAs on wood collection is not due
to investments in energy-conserving technology. However, these results should be interpreted
with the caution in mind that we have a very small study period, and some channels of effect
may take more time. It could also be argued that the households near PAs will switch to
market alternatives for fuel as a reaction to the PAs. However, combining the treatment and
control group, our entire dataset has only 78 households using anything other than firewood.
2.7 Conclusions
We find evidence that establishment of PAs in Nepal led to a decrease in firewood
collection and consumption near PAs. Our estimates indicate that PAs caused household
firewood collection to fall by 30% to 70% . This decrease may be reflected in Figure 2, where
we see evidence from satellite data that forest cover did indeed increase in several of the
treatment PAs after PA establishment.5
We also find that the establishment of PAs is not associated with significant immediate
changes in the per capita consumption of the people who live near them; PAs have not
inflicted great harm, nor has establishment of an ecotourism industry led to great gains for
people close to new PAs in our study period. These results are robust to different alternative
specifications and survive internal validity tests, falsification tests, and inclusion of a wide
5Forest cover loss data was extracted from Hansen et al.’s (2013) dataset (Figure 2).
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range of control variables.
This study has policy implications for the design of conservation instruments. First,
the results show that PAs can result in reduced forest-good collection without necessarily
having a significant negative effect on total household consumption. However, that total
consumption variable may not reveal some actual negative consequences of reduced wood
collection because of the non-monetary nature of the forest good consumption.. We find that
households in Nepal are not shifting toward market substitutes for self-harvested wood as
suggested in many theoretical models (Bode et al., 2015), a result that may be driven by
low access to market and may yield hardship to families who must make do with less fuel.
Efforts to improve household access to alternative fueld sources and stoves may increase
social well-being in villages near PAs in rural Nepal. Second, more stringent conservation
measures can indeed produce greater reductions in forest exploitation. Results in this paper
suggest that the strict PAs produce greater reductions in forest degradation than more lenient
buffer zones. Third, planners should not assume that PAs will attract ecotourism that will
immediately make local people better off; we find no evidence of that occurring in Nepal. It
is possible that these results are Nepal-specific and cannot be generalized to other situations
with different political economies of forest management. However, disentangling the direct
impacts and market consequences of PAs is particularly important in light of IUCN’s recent
advocacy of the Payment for Ecosystem Services in Nepal (Paudel and Vedeld, 2015).
Our study has several limitations. First, it does not include indirect (displacement)
impacts of tourism on the labor market outcomes. Employees in the tourism sector may
be temporary migrants and omitting this spillover may underestimate the overall welfare
impacts. However, NLSS data do not allow us to check for this possibility. Second, PA-based
infrastructure development may take longer than the duration of our study to influence local
labor markets. Tracking these PA communities for a longer period of time will help distinguish
steady-state equilibria from transitional impacts. Finally, this paper only estimates average
treatment effects and does not identify distributional inequities in the impacts of PAs. The
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poorest cohorts may bear the largest adverse impact from PAs if they depend on the forest
for basic survival. Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, but future
research could use the establishment of PAs to understand these effects.
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2.8 Figures
Figure (2.1): Protected Areas of Nepal
Note: Treatment areas are circled (PAs established in 1996-2003), BZ in red circle and
NP/CA in black circle.
Source of shape file: World Database of Protected Area, Available at: www.protectedplanet.net.
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Figure (2.2): Forest Cover Gain in Treatment Protected Areas (2001 - 2014)
Note: These data were derived from Global Forest Change (2000 – 2014). The bars
show forest gain during the period 2000–2014, defined as the inverse of loss, or a non-forest
to forest change entirely within the study period. (Hansen et al., 2013).
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Distance to a PA established in 1996-2003
1996 Mean firewood consumption
2003 Mean firewood consumption
Note: This graph shows the time series variation in the amount of collection depending
on the distance to the nearest PAs.
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Figure (2.4): District-Level Human Development Indexa,b
a The Human Development Index is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education
and per capita income indicators Source: UNDP Human Development Index Report (2011).
b The control groups here are A, B and C.
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2.9 Tables
Table (2.1): Timeline of Establishment of Protected Areas in Nepal (1996-
2003)a











Conservation Area or National Park
Kanchanjenga CA 1998 2035 293 2849
Manaslu CA 1998 1663 214
Shivpuri-Nagarjun NP 2002 159 333 31611
Buffer Zone
Bardia NP 1996 328 968 632 49468
Chitwan NP 1996 750 932 777 534143
Langtang NP 1998 420 1710 396 48312
MakaluBarun NP 1999 830 1500 529 1580
Sagarmantha NP 2002 275 1148 247 193446
Sheyphoksundo NP 1998 1349 3555 246 1776
a Source: Nepal Biodiversity Strategy (2002) and WDPA.
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Table (2.2): Definition of Control Groups
Group Definition Source of information
Treatment Villages around PAs estab-
lished in 1996-2003
NLSS (Community Survey)
(Village name and geocode
with Google map)
Control Group A Villages around PAs around
any forest but not around
treatment PAs
NLSS (Community Survey),
(distance to the forest)
Control Group B Villages around PAs estab-
lished before 1996
PA location shape file
Control Group C Villages around PAs estab-
lished after 2003
PA location shape file
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Table (2.3): Means of Variables for Villages in Treatment Group and Control
Group Aa
Controlb Treatmentb Difference t-statistic
1996



















































a Control group A is defined by the distance to the forest.
b Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table (2.4): Means of Variables for Households in Treatment and Control Group Aa





































































a To utilize the survey nature of NLSS, the covariate means are estimated using sampling
weights. Control group A is defined as households living near forests but not close to any PA.
Treatment group is defined as households living near new PAs.
b Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table (2.5): Means of Variables for Villages in Treatment Group and Control Group
Ba
Controlb Treatmentb Difference t-statistic
1996



















































a Control group B is defined as communities near pre-1996 PAs
b Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table (2.6): Means of Variables for Households in Treatment and Control Group Ba





































































a To utilize the survey nature of NLSS, the covariate means are estimated using sampling
weights. Control group B is defined as communities near pre-1996 PAs.
b Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Treatment 0.103*** -1,252 0.385
(0.0364) (844.3) (0.752)
Post -0.0131 3,365*** -1.070
(0.0330) (965.5) (0.719)
Constant 0.161*** 12,003*** 4.125***
(0.0404) (1,675) (0.774)
Observations 1,396 1,468 1,320
R-squared 0.169 0.257 0.083
HH Controlse Y Y Y




a The control group is A, defined as households living near forests but not close to any
PA. DID regressions. Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Statistical
significance is denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. bFirewood collection quantity is
measured in bhari/per day (1 bhari = 33.28 kg).
c Per capita consumption is measured in Nepalese Rupee.
d Time is measured in hours to collect one bhari.
e Household controls are household size, age and literacy of the household head, asset value.
f Village controls are number of households.
g Geographic controls include dummy for the geographic belts (mountain, hill or low land)
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B C B C B C
Post*Treatment -0.138*** -0.128*** -541.8 3,029 -0.0321 0.737-0.0315 -0.037 -1,297 -2,086 -0.726 -0.794
Treatment 0.150*** 0.131*** 896.3 -0.615 0.108 -665.4
-0.0248 -0.03 -662.4 -0.708 -0.632 (1,244)
Post 0.00341 0.00263 5,896*** -2.119*** -1.257** 4,393**
-0.018 -0.0263 -1,062 -0.647 -0.554 (1,750)
Constant 0.156*** 0.184*** 9,485*** 5.247*** 4.209*** 10,927***
-0.0262 -0.0279 -1,504 -0.612 -0.545 -1,690
Observations 1,262 1,018 1,425 1,008 1,249 1,136
R-
squared
0.208 0.18 0.291 0.107 0.116 0.155
HH
Controlsf
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Village
Controlsg
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic
Controlsh
Y Y Y Y Y Y
a DID regressions. Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Statistical
significance is denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
bFirewood collection quantity is measured in bhari/per day (1 bhari = 33.28 kg).
c Per capita consumption is measured in Nepalese Rupee.
d Time is measured in hours to collect one bhari.
e Control group B is defined as households living near pre-1996 PAs. Control group C is
defined as households living near PAs established after 2004.
f Household controls are household size, age and literacy of the household head, asset
value.
g Village controls are number of households.
h Geographic controls include dummy for the geographic belts (mountain, hill or low land)
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Table (2.9): Placebo Testa
Quantity of Fire-
wood Collected
Control groupb A B
Post∗ Placebo Treatmentc 0.0124 -0.00919
(0.0338) (0.01911)








HH Controlsd Y Y
Village Controlse Y Y
Geographic Controlsf Y Y
a DID regressions. Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Statistical
significance is denoted as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
bControl group A is defined as households living near forests but not close to any PA.
Control group B is defined as households living near pre-1996 PAs.
cPlacebo Treatment group is defined as households near the PAs established in 2009-2010,
far later than our study period.
d Household controls are household size, age and literacy of the household head, asset
value.
e Village controls are number of households.
f Geographic controls include dummy for the geographic belts (mountain, hill or low land).
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Post∗ NP/CA -0.162*** -0.458 500.6 1,090
(0.0526) (1.064) (1,496) (1,857)
Post∗ BZ -0.0515 0.466 1,887 970.7
(0.0464) (1.025) (1,610) (1,713)
NP/CA 0.172*** 0.823 -79.01 608.1
(0.0444) (0.978) (1,070) (1,229)
BZ 0.0635 0.0918 -1,889** 815.5
(0.0385) (0.799) (931.2) (1,168)
Post -0.0218 -1.159 3,275*** -1,823
(0.0335) (0.720) (993.7) (1,182)
Constant 0.169*** 4.231*** 12,002*** -2,867
(0.0416) (0.769) (1,642) (2,149)
Observations 1,396 1,320 1,468 1,439
R-squared 0.184 0.087 0.258 0.101
HH Controlsf Y Y Y Y
Village Controlsg Y Y Y Y
Geographic Controlsh Y Y Y Y
a DID regressions. The control group is A, households not close to any PA.
Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted
as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
bFirewood collection quantity is measured in bhari/per day (1 bhari = 33.28 kg)
c Time has been measured in hours
d Per capita consumption is measured in Nepalese Rupee.
e Agricultural income is measured in Nepalese Rupee.
f Household controls are household size, age and literacy of the household head, asset
value.
gVillage controls are number of households.
h Geographic controls include dummy for the geographic belts.
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Post∗ NP/CA -0.204*** -0.0980 -2,137 1,368
(0.0519) (0.950) (1,632) (2,063)
Post∗ BZ -0.119*** 0.0188 529.6 893.7
(0.0385) (0.817) (1,499) (1,487)
NP/CA 0.231*** 0.131 1,926* 286.6
(0.0379) (0.892) (1,017) (1,103)
BZ 0.134*** 0.0906 265.4 -1,347
(0.0315) (0.675) (635.9) (994.4)
Post 0.0150 -1.261** 5,844*** -1,539
(0.0199) (0.554) (1,063) (967.7)
Constant 0.125*** 4.226*** 9,735*** -2,019
(0.0275) (0.554) (1,433) (2,040)
Observations 1,425 1,249 1,425 1,389
R-squared 0.249 0.116 0.293 0.105
HH Controlsf Y Y Y Y
Village Controlsg Y Y Y Y
Geographic Controlsh Y Y Y Y
a The control group is B, defined as households living near pre-1996 PAs.
DID regressions. Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Statistical
significance is denoted as ∗ ∗ ∗ p<0.01, ∗ ∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
bFirewood collection quantity is measured in bhari/per day (1 bhari = 33.28 kg).
c Time has been measured in hours.
d Per capita consumption is measured in Nepalese Rupee.
e Agricultural income is measured in Nepalese Rupee.
f Household controls are household size, age and literacy of the household head, asset
value.
gVillage controls are number of households.
h Geographic controls include dummy for the geographic belts (mountain, hill or low
land).
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-0.173*** 0.233 3,322 2972.67
(0.0523) (0.964) (2,741) (2633)
Post∗ BZ -0.106*** 0.828 3,009 2670
(0.0365) (0.826) (2,274) (1599)
Observations 1,018 1,008 1,136 912
R-squared 0.212 0.130 0.186 0.161
HH
Controlsf
Y Y Y Y
Village
Controlsg
Y Y Y Y
Geographic
Controlsh
Y Y Y Y
a The control group is B, defined as households living near pre-1996 PAs.
DID regressions. Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Statistical
significance is denoted as *** p<0.01, ∗ ∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
bFirewood collection quantity is measured in bhari/per day (1 bhari = 33.28 kg).
c Time has been measured in hours.
d Per capita consumption is measured in Nepalese Rupee.
e Agricultural income is measured in Nepalese Rupee.
f Household controls are household size, age and literacy of the household head, asset
value.
gVillage controls are number of households.
h Geographic controls include dummy for the geographic belts (mountain, hill or low
land).
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Table (2.13): Robustness Checks for Impacts of Different Types of Protected
Areasa





ExpenditureFirewood Collection Firewood Collection
Collected Time Collected Time
Post*NP/CA
-0.127** -0.616 1,343 -0.26*** 0.58 1,587
-0.0542 -1.087 -1,765 -0.0992 -0.703 -2,188
Post*BZ -0.0771 -0.353 2,047 -0.01 1.332 2,041
-0.0519 -1.245 -1,669 -0.0488 -1.193 -1,802
NP/CA 0.146*** 1.155 -631.4 0.206** -1.199* 842.9
-0.0469 -0.967 -1,141 -0.0873 -0.658 -1,409
BZ 0.0509 0.863 -1,937 0.0538 -0.826 -2,038**
-0.0467 -0.87 -1,217 (0.0425) (1.110) -954.1
Post -0.0451 -0.838 2,225* -0.0276 -2.113** 4,365***
-0.0404 -0.792 -1,247 -0.034 -1.036 -897.9
Constant 0.159*** 3.527*** 14,332*** 0.182*** 5.439*** 9,974***
-0.0484 -0.876 -1,946 -0.0434 -1.077 -1,973
Observations 963 942 987 1,059 984 1,123
R-
squared
0.212 0.121 0.253 0.156 0.123 0.27
HH Con-
trolsd
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Village
Controlse
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic
Controlsf
Y Y Y Y Y Y
a DID regressions. Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Statistical
significance is denoted as ∗ ∗ ∗ p<0.01, ∗ ∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Regressions use control group
A.
b Excluding lowland denotes analysis after removing lowland of Nepal from empirical
analysis
c Mean (maximum elevation for control group) = 2.30, and mean(maximum elevation for
treatment group)= 2.18
d Household controls are household size, age and literacy of the household head, asset
value.
e Village controls are number of households.
f Geographic controls include dummy for the geographic belts (mountain, hill or low land).
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Post∗ NP/CA -0.135** 0.201 992.0
(0.0576) (0.928) (1,767)
Post∗ BZ -0.0924∗ 1.063 1,100
(0.0551) (1.101) (2,088)
NP/CA 0.137*** 0.418 -849.8
(0.0492) (0.791) (1,345)
BZ 0.0985** -0.0908 -1,343
(0.0474) (0.824) (1,219)
Time -0.0274 -1.327* 3,349***
(0.0344) (0.746) (1,052)
Constant 0.167*** 4.626*** 12,560***
(0.0451) (0.778) (1,885)
Observations 1,132 1,069 1,190
R-squared 0.176 0.104 0.244
HH Controlse Y Y Y
Village Controlsf Y Y Y
Geographic Controlsg Y Y Y
a Households are defined as treated in this regression if they are within 10 km of a PA
b DID regressions. Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Statistical
significance is denoted as ∗ ∗ ∗ p<0.01, ∗ ∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
c Regressions use control group A.
d Dependent variable is the rate at which households are moving toward the village mean
of quantity of firewood collection.
e Household controls are household size, age and literacy of the household head, asset
value
f Village controls are number of households.
g Geographic controls include dummy for the geographic belts (mountain, hill or low land)
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Table (2.15): Panel Group Characteristics at Baseline
(Control) (Treatment) (Mean Differ-
ence)
Mean SD Mean SD SD
Household size 5.958333 2.714684 5.922619 2.266647 0.0357 0.13
Per-capita con-
sumption
6943.966 5205.649 7101.549 4201.677 -157.6 -0.22
Firewood con-
sumption
.2700224 .204959 .3331325 .2026258 -0.0631∗ ∗ -2.74
Distance to
nearest PA
62.93024 19.18381 9.916786 6.308276 53.01*** 34.03
Value of the
land
143977 122827.4 172094.6 383740 -28117.6 -0.61
Distance to for-
est (hour)
2.011905 1.225908 2.625 1.668437 -.6130952** .226578
Distance to mar-
ket (min)
147.2727 39.01049 176.7949 81.92975 -29.52214 25.61845
Observations 168 168 336
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(Difference in Difference) (Difference
in Difference)










HH Controls YES YES
Village Controls YES YES
aStandard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as ∗ ∗ ∗ p<0.01, ∗ ∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
bColumns show DID estimates compared with Control A. Control is defined as households living around
forests but not close to any PA.
3Only 30 households live around strict PAs in this panel dataset, which restricts me to estimate regression
model 8.
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Post∗ NP/CA 0.0953 7,130 0.443 -0.0880 0.116 -0.0366
(0.0697) (19,498) (0.661) (0.0855) (0.144) (0.115)
Post∗ BZ 0.0347 -2,359 -1.006* 0.310*** -0.0260 0.0404
(0.0747) (24,594) (0.550) (0.104) (0.121) (0.132)
NP/CA -0.138** -25,269 0.271 -0.0314 0.0321 0.0391
(0.0553) (19,685) (0.595) (0.0584) (0.117) (0.112)
BZ 0.0146 -3,065 0.830* -0.0120 0.0640 -0.0200
(0.0644) (21,978) (0.452) (0.0517) (0.0753) (0.112)
Post -0.139** 1,386 1.389*** 0.0965* -0.0331 -0.138
(0.0564) (16,775) (0.354) (0.0581) (0.0800) (0.0965)
Constant 0.249*** -15,016 3.230*** 0.202*** 0.413*** 0.461***
(0.0850) (17,367) (0.747) (0.0738) (0.101) (0.154)
Observations 1,468 360 1,618 1,468 1,373 1,468
R-squared 0.051 0.086 0.182 0.150 0.261 0.009
HH Controlsc Y Y Y Y Y Y
Village Controlsd Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic
Controlse
Y Y Y Y Y Y
a DID regressions. Regressions with binary outcome variables use linear probability model. Standard
errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as ∗ ∗ ∗ p<0.01, ∗
∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Regressions use control group A.
b Dependent variables are number of total number of migrants from one household, amount of
the remittance received in last year, hours of labor supply of the household head, a dummy for
community forest, a dummy for stoves, and number of unemployed persons in the household.
c Household controls are household size, age and literacy of the household head, asset value.
d Village controls are number of households.
eGeographic controls include dummy for the geographic belts (mountain, hill or low land).
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CHAPTER 3
RECOVERY FROM THE DUST BOWL:
IMPLICATION OF LAND CONSERVATION
PROGRAMS IN THE GREAT PLAINS
3.1 Introduction
“The history of every Nation is eventually written in the way in which it
cares for its soil.” - Franklin D. Roosevelt on signing the Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act, 1936.
Farmland conservation policies help to reduce the rate of enrichment of atmospheric
CO2, mitigate impacts of climate change and increase the resilience of the ecosystem (Lal,
2004; Thuiller, 2007; Webb et al., 2017).1 The benefit of farmland conservation has been
established in soil science and agroecology (Lele, 2017, Sweikert and Gigliotti, 2019).
However, due to market and budgetary pressures, federal conservation programs have often
been designed with strong spatial targeting unrelated to actual erosion problems. A
consequence of a market-induced conservation program is that it creates spatial variation in
long-term ecological benefit from conservation policies. Excessive dependence on federal
subsidies to promote conservation also generates the question of whether landowners
continue to conserve land after removal of the subsidy. Only a few settings permit study of
1Soils store more carbon than the planet’s biomass and atmosphere combined. An increase of just 1% of
the carbon stocks in the top meter of soils would be higher than the amount corresponding to the annual CO2
emissions from all fossil fuel burning (Smith et al., 2016, Turner et al., 2016, Scholes et al., 2018, Eswaran,
Lal, and Reich, 2001). According to the most comprehensive analysis of global biodiversity data to date
(Newbold et al., 2016), biodiversity has dropped below the safe limit across 58 percent of the earth’s surface
due to land degradation. In recent years, many governments and international agencies have become active
in executing local and global policies to reduce land degradation, and thus, save critical habitat (Elbehri
et al., 2017; Hellerstein, 2017, Stevens, 2018).
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how farmland conservation policies affect the agricultural landscape, especially in the long
run. Historical events may provide a more complete picture of effects as farmland
conservation policies take time to affect the landscape. This paper studies the long-term
impacts on the environment in the counties following the earliest farmland conservation
policies in the United States.
Long-term consequences of historical events have been analyzed using settings from
other strands of the literature in natural resource economics (Boustan et al., 2017; Quinn,
2017). Recent economic history papers develop intuition on how current conditions are path
dependent on early historical events (Hornbeck and Keskin, 2011; Hornbeck, 2012; Libecap
and Wiggins, 1984; Hansen and Libecap, 2004; Fiszbein, 2017; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005).
Empirical studies have been conducted on policies related to air pollution (Cohen et al.,
2017), flood (Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014), drought (Freire-González, Decker, and Hall, 2017),
water management (Hornbeck and Keskin, 2014), and waste management (Alsan and Goldin,
2015).2 However, little effort has been made to understand the long-term impact of land
conservation policies on environmental quality. Research on the short-term effects of land
conservation policies have often shown ambiguous results (Robalino, 2007; Deininger, 2003),
so it is crucial to study how land conservation policies change the landscape over time.
Assessing the effects of historical events and policies provide a valuable setting to estimate
the effects of land conservation policies that may take time to demonstrate impacts. Land
conservation policies in the USA are closely tied to market pressure since the birth of the
program.3 This paper takes advantage of the introduction of farmland conservation policies
in the post-Dust Bowl USA counties, compiles a database from multiple sources and tracks
the effects of those policies for more than fifty years to understand the short- and long-term
effects on environmental quality.
I draw evidence starting from the first farmland conservation attempt, known as the
2A new term Environmental Economic History has been proposed to understand the persistent impact of
early shocks and policies (Fenske and Kala, 2017).
3For more details on the evolution and political economy of Farm Bills, see Coppess, 2018.
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Voluntary Acreage Reduction Program in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA)
under the New Deal. This policy induced aggressive farmland conversion from crop
production, with much of that conversion occurring in the Great Plains.4 Farmland
conservation policies in the USA were established in the aftermath of the historic soil erosion
event during the 1930s known as the “American Dust Bowl.” Native grassland destruction
and failure to adopt dryland agricultural practices in the Great Plains during the late
nineteenth century caused this event, in which almost 75% of the topsoil in the Great Plains
was blown away (Hornbeck, 2012, Wenger, 1941). The federal government was motivated to
implement extensive fiscal policies right away as part of what was popularly known as the
New Deal (Schlesinger, 2003). In a series of papers, Fishback and coauthors establish the
implication of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) on the local economy through public
finance policies (Fishback, 2016). 5 Land conservation policies in the New Deal had been
accused of having negative impacts on tenant farmers in the South and leading to the
eviction of low-income people from farmland areas (Depew, Fishback, and Rhode, 2013). I
explore a new dimension of AAA to understand the long-term impact of the economy
through environmental restoration. Did the land conservation policies conserve soil and
restore grassland in the Great Plains? Did the policies have persistent environmental effects?
Do farmers continue to invest in the soil even after removal of federal subsidy? This paper
4The target of Voluntary Acreage Reduction was twofold: the reduction of soil erosion and an increase in
crop prices (Bennett, 1928)
5Empirical economists have recently studied many facets of the New Deal because of the availability of
detailed county-level data over a long period (Fishback, 2017). Main sources of identification in these papers
come from changes across time within the same geographic location after controlling for national shocks to the
economy. Many of the studies also use instrumental variable methods to control for endogeneity. These studies
explore the short- and long-term enduring impact of the Dust Bowl on farmland and population (Hornbeck,
2012), homeownership policies (Courtemanche and Snowden, 2011), farm technological improvement (Fishback,
Kantor, and Sorensen, 2005), fiscal federalism (Wallis, 1991, Wright, 1974), unemployment (Wallis, 1991),
migration (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2006), and health (Barreca, Fishback, and Kantor, 2012; Arthi,
2018). The studies find that public works and relief spending increased consumption activity, attracted
internal migration, reduced crime rates, and lowered several types of mortality. The farm programs typically
aided large farm owners but reduced opportunities for sharecroppers, tenants, and farm workers. The Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation’s purchases and refinancing of troubled mortgages staved off drops in housing
prices and homeownership rates at relatively low ex-post cost to taxpayers. The Reconstruction Finance
Corporation’s loans to banks and railroads appear to have had a little positive impact, although the banks
were aided when the RFC took ownership stakes (Fishback, 2017)
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fills in this gap by providing empirical evidence to understand the persistent and immediate
impacts of a New Deal program in the Great Plains on the restoration of grassland and
pasture land, and also soil erosion levels.
Figure 1 provides underlying intuition. The graph shows a sharp increase in the federal
farmland conservation budget in the 1930s; throughout the last century the annual budget
for farmland conservation never exceeded that initial allocation. In this paper, I create a new
dataset to explore how crop reduction programs affect an agricultural landscape and
environment over several decades. I extracted information mainly from archives and
agricultural and population census. This post-Dust Bowl program was designed in part to
reduce soil erosion, but there is no direct proxy for soil erosion that is measured consistently
over time. Natural Resource Inventory (NRI) database on the county-level soil erosion is
available only from 1982. I use this county-level soil erosion data from NRI to see the
long-term persistent impacts on erosion from the New Deal farmland conservation programs.
For the primary analysis on the continuous effect of the program, instead, I estimate the
effect of the New Deal on the area under different grasses in the Great Plains. To do so, I
construct a county-level long panel data for more than fifty years from agricultural census
and population census. I also use the historical land use and land cover database from 1938
created by USGS.
To identify the causal effect of this farmland conservation policy, I combine temporal
and spatial variation of the policy. This land conversion policy was limited only to six
commercial market crops: cotton, wheat, corn, tobacco, rice, and peanut. To calculate the
acreage of cropland reduction needed in each county, the county agents used the past years’
(1929 – 1932) average crop acreage. USDA claimed that over 90% of the landowners agreed
to reduce their farmland at the time (Depew, Fishback, and Rhode, 2013). My empirical
strategy depends on the fact that the conservation policy was crop specific, so there is
exogenous spatial variation in policy intensity. To create exogenous crop-specific spatial
variation, we instrument actual crop intensity with the FAO-GAEZ provided agro-climatic
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data on potential crop yield that is unrelated to any human decision process. I use this
instrument to study the persistent effects of the early farmland conservation policies.
I start the empirical analysis by demonstrating the persistent effect of county-level
AAA budgets on changes in future area of grassland and soil erosion. At a more
disaggregated level, using this pre-policy spatial variation of acreage under the eligible
commercial crops in the Great Plains and the timing of the policy variation at the federal
level, I study the average annual impacts of this conservation policy. There is a persistent
correlation between these two variables even after controlling for geographic variables and
state fixed effects. This correlation suggests that crop-based conservation policies may have
been effective in restoring grassland. However, this correlation could be driven by
unobservable preference in farmers’ risk management or technology adoption. To identify the
causal effect of non-randomly assigned farmland conservation program on grassland
restoration, I use information from an observational setting where an exogenous increase of
farmland conservation happens because the federal acreage allotment was based on those
previously-explained six commercial crops. A farm’s acreage allotment, under provisions of
permanent commodity price support law, is its share, based on its previous production, of
the national acreage needed to produce sufficient supplies of that particular crop. To identify
the causal effect, I exploit this exogenous variation in historical agricultural production
pattern captured by the 1930 agricultural census. This data is pre-Dust Bowl acreage
information, so it does not depend on the land use changes after the policy. The identifying
assumption is that without the policy, counties with different areas of targeted crops would
have experienced similar patterns of grassland restoration.
Farmland conservation policy generated a substantial increase in grassland and
decreased future soil erosion within the state. In counties with a high intensity of targeted
crops, I find detectable effects on reduced soil erosion and increased grassland. Following the
introduction of the policy, grassland acres increased substantially in wheat and corn counties;
and the effect is persistent over time. The years with no budget for conservation show a
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sharp decrease in land conservation. To better understand the mechanisms behind the
impact, I estimate heterogeneous treatment effect by farm size, tenancy, access to credit,
access to non-farm jobs, and access to irrigation (Wenger, 1941). While farmland
conservation policies helped to generate soil-conserving grassland in the Great Plains, these
estimates imply that interacting price stabilization policies with soil conservation policies
may have long-term ecological consequences. Farmers may not fully utilize the benefit of soil
conservation if they depend on federal subsidy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical background of the
policy. Section 3 describes the underlying conceptual model. Section 4 describes the data
construction and exploratory statistics. Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy, and Section
6 reports the results. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Historical Background
3.2.1 Nature of The Great Plains
The Great Plains, as defined in this paper, comprises of ten states: Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and
Texas (see Figure 2 for the study regions). The identifiers of the Great Plains consist of three
physical bases of this area: almost level surface, treeless land and insufficient rainfall (Webb,
1959). The High Plains may be taken as the point of departure from these characteristics;
otherwise, the Great Plains counties are almost always semi-humid or semi-arid counties.
According to JW Powell, it is the 100th meridian or 20-inch rainfall line that defines the
climatic variation in the Great Plains (Stegner, 1992). Land in such areas cannot be used
under the same farming method that is employed on the East coast or in European countries
from where homestead farmers were arriving at the plains. The native short grasses in this
area naturally hold water in the soil and control wind erosion by keeping soil on the ground.
In the late nineteenth century, population and agricultural expansion to the Western
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frontier started to cause rapid destruction of native grassland in the Great Plains (Webb,
1959). On top of that, World War 1 created strong demand for wheat in Europe. In the face
of high demand for crops and with encouragement from the Homestead Act, farmers
continued to uproot native grassland from the Great Plains region and went to marginal land
in the plains to plant wheat. Grassland is an essential component of the Great Plains
ecosystem, and this commercial farming method disturbed the organic components of the
soil. The result was one of the biggest human-made natural disasters, commonly known as
the "Dust Bowl" (Schubert et al., 2004). Drought and wind erosion is a part of the nature of
the Great Plains, but continuous drought in the 1930s coupled with grassland destruction
converted the landscape into a desert. In 1934 and 1936 there was massive crop failure due
to the continuous drought and sandstorm. These continued through 1938 and ended after
1940 when rainfall was back. By 1938, the peak year of erosion, 10 million acres had lost at
least the upper five inches of topsoil; another 13.5 million acres had lost at least two and a
half inches. On average 408 tons of dirt were blown away from an average acre, in some cases
to the next state or even beyond (Worster, 2004). 6
3.2.2 Federal Conservation Programs
In the 1920s, after the First World War, discussion on the method of farmland
conservation started to take place at the federal level. Soil scientist Hugh Hammond Bennett
suggested possible solutions to reduce the level of soil erosion, and the economic depression
in the 1920s helped him to argue that excess supply of commodities and soil erosion could
simultaneously be solved by taking marginal land out of production (Bennett, 1928). In
1931, the first Land Utilization conference occurred in Chicago, and the policy suggestions
from this conference were to buy 75 million acres of marginal farmland and convert to better
6A newspaper reporter gave the Dust Bowl its name. Associated Press reporter Robert Geiger opened
his April 15, 1935, dispatch with this line: “Three little words achingly familiar on a Western farmer’s tongue,
rule life in the dust bowl of the continent—if it rains." In a couple of weeks the term had entered the national
newspapers.
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land use (e.g., forest or grassland). However, no actual policy was adopted until the next
election in 1933. When several droughts hit the USA in the 1930s and no ground cover was
left to stop wind erosion, most regions lost more than 75% of the topsoil.
Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected in 1933, and in the first 100 days of his presidency,
he established the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA, popularly known as the First New
Deal). To implement reductions in harvested lands, the Department of Agriculture did an
extensive soil survey in 1933 known as Reconnaissance Soil Survey. Land Utilization policies
(purchasing submarginal eroded farmland) was a big part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of the New Deal in 1933. The initial program was designed to permanently buy all
submarginal land, though budget constraints and farmers’ opposition prevented that plan
from being implemented. However, the federal government still purchased a portion of the
submarginal land, and the Forest Service was responsible for converting that to grassland
(Hurt, 1985). Other than that, farmers were encouraged to put grasses back in their farmland.
For example, A Kansas agricultural experimental station released bulletin to reestablish
grasses by the hay method (Hornbeck, 2012). Hay method was developed in 1937 to increase
pasture in the cropland. It was accepted that pastureland is better than cropland for the
ecosystem of the Great Plains. Agricultural experiment stations and Soil Conservation
Service (SCS) encouraged farmers to shift land from wheat into hay and pasture (SCS).
To implement this, in a major part of the New Deal, the federal government entered
into short-term contracts with the landowners to limit production. "Voluntary Acreage
Reduction" was a complicated policy, but mostly farm owners would be paid not to produce
or to remove acreage from production. The payments were conditional on the conversion of
farmland to soil-conserving grassland and crops in the Great Plains under the Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 1936. The federal government sets an annual
national target of total maximum cropland for these crops. Farm prices would be pegged to
the purchasing power of farm population in 1909 - 1913, and millers and processors would
pay for much of the cost of the program. Importantly, Voluntary Acreage Reduction was
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applicable only to some commercial crops for which prices were low: wheat, corn, cotton,
peanut, rice, and tobacco. The Farm Security Administration at USDA designed an aerial
survey to detect the land where they should reduce cropland (Weems, 2004).
National marketing quotas and acreage allotments had been established for corn,
cotton, wheat, tobacco, rice, and peanut. Because of the Supreme Court decision on the
AAA as unconstitutional, and because of the Second World War and referendum against
allotments, allotments were not continuously in operation for each of the major crops. When
these laws were in effect that national acreage allotments are divided among the states
producing the commodities. The state allotments were then divided among the counties, and
local committees apportioned the county allotments among individual producers. Figure 3
plots the discontinuity of the annual program.
County extension agents were responsible for implementing the local allocation of the
farmland reduction. The payment to the farmers from the program depended on the
expected yield from that land which county agents calculated based on past yield.7 Acreage
reductions ranged between 25% to 50% of the previous year’s acreage. Under the AAA,
farmers could refuse the payment, but most farmers agreed to reduce cropland. I collected
data from the National Archives on county-level payments from the state most affected by
the Dust Bowl (RG 114). Figure 4 shows the correlation between payment per acre and 1930
crop intensity. This indicates that payment was strongly determined by the initial crop
intensity.
There is early theoretical literature on the implication of AAA on the reduction of risk
associated with crop price volatility. These studies try to design relevant agricultural subsidy,
7The 1936 policy was used to control the supply of some specific crops to put upward pressure on the
price. The Secretary of Agriculture had the power to specify the price targets and the crops to control and
how much acreage to set aside; those crop-specific decisions depended on many factors including foreign
demand, domestic consumption, and domestic stock. The USDA needed to have a significant employee base
to implement the acreage limitation. More than 3,000 county agents and 100,000 local people from farming
counties were working with farmers to take the desired amount of cropland out of production. The local
land retirement decisions depended on the local county agents who calculated the retirement payment rate
from past cropland productivities. Local county agents were responsible for determining the base year yields
for farmers with the help of historical county-level average yield data. The desired base year crop acreage
reduction was decided based on previous years’ data on acreage (from 1929 to 1932).
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optimal crop storage policies and federal distribution of conservation funding across potential
instruments (Floyd, 1965; Garst and Miller, 1975; Lidman and Bawden, 1974; Ericksen and
Collins, 1985). Due to the lack of available microdata sets, these papers are mostly
theoretical and lack an empirical investigation to support the theoretical conclusions (Lidman
and Bawden, 1974). There are studies from a historical perspective on how government
programs affect the crop acreage and actual crop yield (Houck et al., 1976; Garst and Miller,
1975). Effective support prices are used as a means of estimating the impacts of government
programs on planted acreages of major crops (Garst and Miller, 1975). This agricultural
economics literature does not focus on the environmental impacts of the program.
Subsequent policies were also continued to do the same thing by reducing cropland and
increasing more soil conservation base (Bruton, 1933; Depew, Fishback, and Rhode, 2013).
This initial budget allocation does the institutional change by creating Farm Bills, hiring
extension agents and creating Soil Conservation Service. The next Farm Bills also had similar
laws but with the same idea of reducing commercial crops. The next couple of popular Farm
Bills would be Set-Aside program in 1957, Farm Bill 1985 and Farm Bill 1996. Farm Bill
1985 introduces the next massive farmland conservation program, Conservation Reserve
Program, and so, to study the effect of the AAA, this paper focuses on the pre-1985 years.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
The Dust Bowl changed the federal budget in a discontinuous fashion. After the initial
jump in the budget allocation, the intensity of the policy was much lower. We can see this in
a graph (Fig-1). This process follows a two-step random variable where q shows the presence
of a shock (climate event). Our purpose is to see the persistent effect of this timing. The
initial event is a jump of size u which may create a persistent effect on the landscape. The
initial high jump in funding in 1930s includes the initial push in funding for better topsoil
base after the Dust Bowl and also includes all institutional and legal changes made in the
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first Farm Bills.
For a farmer, the objective is to maximize the discounted stream of profits attainable
with input package Z and grassland G. The production function is denoted by f . The unit
cost of production is C. The state variable is the grassland stock G. The control variable is
the input Z. Imagine a finite jump in the size of grassland state variable after the Dust Bowl.
A discrete jump in the stock can be achieved by a momentarily infinite investment. G+(t1)
be the state variable immediately after the jump, while G−(t1) is the value before the jump.
The time t1 and the magnitude of jump is G+ −G−. The state variable’s evolution follows
the typical pattern after t1.




[Pf(Z,G)− Cf(Z,G) + s(G)]dt+G+(t1)−G−(t1) (3.1)
subject to
G′(t) = g(Z,G), G(0) = G0; G(T ) > 0; Z(t) > 0 (3.2)
Farmers will participate as long as the discounted expected profit is higher than the
discounted expected profit from non-participation. In characterizing relative adjustment with
time, assume that a farmer chooses input decisions in every period to maximize the present
value of profit. Initial shock prompts taking decisions at an extensive margin. After the Dust
Bowl, at any point of time, t, acreage under grassland is a summation of persistent effect
from the 1930s and the annual impact of that year’s budget. There are four possibilities as
described in Figure 5:
• Scenario A: Initial impact from the event u does not degrade, later annual funding also
has a non-durable impact. At any given point of time, environmental variables will
comprise of both persistent and immediate effects of the soil conservation budget
(Panel (a)).
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• Scenario B: No persistent impact from the event u, grassland is only maintained by
flows of funding. At any given point of time, we can only see the annual immediate
effect of conservation budget (Panel (b)).
• Scenario C: No impact from the farmland conservation policies (Panel (c)).
• Scenario D: Initial spike has a persistent impact, but later funds are ineffective (Panel
(d)).
Section 3 empirically examines this persistent effect of the initial institutional changes.
After the initial shock, in the t = T , land allocation changes only at the intensive margin
depending on the annual variation in the federal budget. The important insight from this
framework is that there may be a persistent impact on the landscape from the initial budget.







: how the farmer’s yield function changes with land restoration, and how the federal
budget affects land restoration. The results vary over space depending on the spatial
variation of the initial crop intensity, farmer’s capacity to adjust the land to optimize
production (farm size, tenancy) and other geophysical constraints (availability of irrigation).
Access to credit may also play an essential role as land conversion is expensive.
3.4 Data Construction and Baseline Characteristics
3.4.1 Data Construction
Historical county-level data are drawn from the United States Census of Agriculture
and the Census of Population (Haines, 2005). I use 824 contiguous Great Plains counties in
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas (study area is shown in Fig-2). I construct a panel of 824
counties of the Great Plains over 50 years of data on environmental outcomes, average farm
characteristics, average farmers’ characteristics, and county and geographic control variables.
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I collect information from federal documents on annual soil conservation budget of USDA,
maps on land conversion plan in 1937 and yearly federal marketing quota by crops from
marketing statistics. I construct this data from USDA agricultural census, from Natural
Resource Conservation Service data archives at National Archives at College Park (NRCS,
RG 114), population census and USDA marketing statistical books. I construct export data
by country and crops from USA agricultural export databook. The empirical analysis uses a
balanced panel of plain counties, from 1925 to 1985. I restrict the study period before the
introduction of the Conservation Reserve Program in 1985. 8
To have consistent units of observation over time in spite of changes in county
boundaries, I adjust all data according to the ICPSR standard boundary from 1910 (Haines,
2005). I draw historical county-level population data, including racial composition, from the
Census of Population (Haines, 2005). The population census is conducted every ten years.
For consistency, I drop information on Indian Reserves and Yellowstone National Park from
the county-level data.
For the empirical analysis on the immediate impact of the annual conservation budget,
I use two sources of information for environmental variables. I use data from the agricultural
census, which gives me a complete picture of county-level agricultural evolution in the USA.
USDA agricultural census asks information on different soil conserving grass acres at the
county level. The grasses include mainly legume, hay, tame, alfalfa. I include the soil
retaining grasses for which USDA paid the farmers from each agricultural census. The other
source of information is provided by the U.S. Geological Survey, named "Enhanced Historical
Land-Use and Land-Cover Data Sets (1938 - 1992)" (Sohl et al., 2016). Historical LULC is a
polygon-format raster database that gives annual information on grassland and cropland. I
construct an annual area under grassland/pasture from this raster database. 9
8Farm Bill 1985 creates the Conservation Reserve Program and this program permanently retires land for
conservation purpose. I limit the study period to before 1985 to gauge the effect from other early conservation
programs.
9Researchers at the US Geological Survey have used a wide range of historical data sources and a spatially
explicit modeling framework to model spatially explicit historical LULC change in the conterminous United
States from 1992 back to 1938. Annual LULC maps were produced at the 250-m resolution, with 14 LULC
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For the empirical analysis on the persistent impact of the post-Dust Bowl peak, I use
another environmental variable other than grassland which is county-level wind-induced soil
erosion data from National Resource Inventory (NRI). NRI is a panel data for the period
1982 to 2012. This erosion data has been collected by USDA Natural Resource Conservation
Service on the same geographic location for the whole country. This data provides
information on wind-induced soil erosion for both cropland and pastureland. For the
persistent analysis, my other outcome variable is land cover summaries from the National
Land Cover Database. The NLCD data have a 30-meter spatial resolution and were derived
from a decision-tree classification of Landsat satellite imagery. NHGIS provides
environmental summaries from 2001, 2006, and 2011 versions of the NLCD. These three
NLCD versions were created using a consistent methodology and are comparable over time.
To get a rough idea about the intensity of drought I use temperature and precipitation data
to create the Palmer Drought Severity Index. A month-wise average PDSI is provided in the
appendix. 10
To understand the federal conservation policy intensity and timing, I collect historical
USDA annual statistical books to obtain data on the annual acreage allotment of crop
production. I manually collect this data by year and crops. I collect and digitize Land
Utilization maps from the National Archives also to construct a targeted conversion index for
counties in the Great Plain. Jacks, 2013 is the source of world commodity price data. Soil
Conservation budget from 1935 to 1985 comes from USDA. I draw on the county-level total
expenditure for the AAA from Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis, 2003. This dataset has
information on the federal expenditure by the New Deal programs aggregated over the years
from 1933 to 1940 and was collected from the Congressional Budget Office. This data gives
classes. Assessment of model results showed good agreement with trends and spatial patterns in historical
data sources such as the Census of Agriculture and historical housing density data.
10Temperature and precipitation data are extracted from PRISM. The PRISM Climate Group gathers
climate observations from a wide range of monitoring networks, applies sophisticated quality control measures,
and develops spatial climate datasets to reveal short- and long-term climate patterns. The resulting datasets
incorporate a variety of modeling techniques and are available at multiple spatial and temporal resolutions,
covering the period from 1895 to the present.
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information on various projects under the New Deal (e.g., relief plan, home loan, etc.). I use
the county-level AAA land-retirement payments to farmers to see the spatial variation of the
payment by crop areas. However, this data is extracted only for Oklahoma. 11
Information on crops, farm and farmer characteristics have been extracted from USDA
agricultural census. This county-level information is provided every five years and is
designed to be representative. The main variables of interest include: total farmland, total
harvested acreage, average farm size, number of tractors, size of the farm population, the
share of land planted for targeted program crops: rice, peanut, corn, cotton, tobacco and
wheat, the proportion of non-farm owner-operators, the percentage of sharecroppers and
cash tenants, black farm population, non-farm jobs, and farm labor expenditures. I also use
population census to extract county-level racial decomposition.
For the empirical instrumental variable analysis, I create an exogenous measure of crop
intensity by county from FAO-GAEZ database. These yields are calculated by incorporating
climatic variables into a model that predicts the maximum potential yields for each crop in a
given area. Figure 6 shows this potential yield variation in the USA. I also construct a
measure of crop intensity from the agricultural census by using crop area and total farmland.
Figure 7 displays the spatial variation in crop intensity before the Dust Bowl (in 1930).
With this detailed information on land use, federal policy and economic variables, henceforth,
we are able to estimate the effect of the conservation policy on the land use change and
environmental outcomes.
3.4.2 Baseline Characteristics and Aggregate Trends
Table 1 reports the name of the variables and data sources. Table 2 reports the
county-level summary statistics from the agricultural census. Total harvest area drops down
significantly after 1940, and average farm size rises after 1940. As the racial composition
suggests, the Great Plains has always been a white-dominated area. Though popularly
11For a future version of this paper, I will collect data on states.
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known as continuous population decline in the Great Plains, on average population is not
drastically fluctuating. Rural-urban migration was the main coping strategy. The sharp loss
in total harvested area in between 1940 and 1950 partly shows what we are trying to see.
Increase in farmsize is also a targeted consolidation from USDA. Percentage of cotton, corn,
wheat all three main crops drop down in 1930 and 1950. Understanding the implication of
this crop acreage loss in the perspective of environmental outcomes is the target of this
paper.12
I also create figures with aggregated trends of important variables used in the analysis.
Figure 8 shows the aggregate changes in total farmland(acres) in the Great Plain. Figure 9
shows the aggregated changes in total harvested acreage by crops. Figure 10 disaggregates
total farmland by crop. We can see that the Great Plains had three main crops: cotton,
corn, and wheat. Panel A to Panel F presents the proportion of farmland under different
crops over the same period. It can be seen that all the crops have a sharp reduction in
acreage from 1930 to 1940, and then slowly increase again.
Figure 3 presents the annual crop acreage allotment by crop (in thousand acres). I
manually collected this information from USDA-provided market acreage allotment and
agricultural statistical books. The graph shows the highest amount of land that the USDA
wanted to have planted in each of the six program crops each year; payments would be
provided to encourage farmers to take excess acres out of production. The data also show
that the program was not active during some years. Figure 11 is a map showing the
farmland designated as unsuitable for crop production based on the soil survey. This map
helps us to understand spatial patterns in the actual need for conservation. I obtained this
map from the National Archives at College Park (RG 114). The map suggests places that
would be appropriate for conversion from farmland to grazing (grassland), forest, and a
mixture of grassland and forest. Figure 12 shows the farmland that was permanently bought
and converted to national grassland by the USDA before policy shifted to temporary land
12For more information of summary statistics by disaggregated years, see Appendices. Detailed of price
and climate data are also available in the online appendix.
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retirement incentives.
We can do a simple exploratory analysis to understand the correlation between the later
environmental variables and early farmland programs. To understand a basic correlation, I
use soil erosion variables from 1982 - 2012 and use county-level cumulative funding for
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) as the explanatory variable. County-level AAA funding
data is extracted from Fishback, 2016. This is a cumulative amount of money collected from
county data book (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2006) This is a cumulative amount of
money for the programs under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Figure 13 and Figure 14
show this exploratory analysis. For the cropland erosion rate, the relationship is not clear.
However, for the pastureland wind erosion rate, we can see a persistent negative relationship
that denotes how early AAA funding areas have less pastureland erosion at different future
point of times. Information on the total money into Voluntary Acreage Reduction program is
not available. However, I collect payment per acre by county in Oklahoma from the National
Archives; and show how that corresponds to the county-level crop intensity.
3.5 Empirical Framework
3.5.1 Persistent Impact: Exploratory Analysis
In an initial step, the empirical analysis explores the within-state persistent impact of
the early conservation policy on environmental outcomes in future. Referring back to the
conceptual framework, this corresponds to the Scenario A (panel (a)) in Figure 5, where we
expect early policies to have a non-degrading impact over time because of the permanent
institutional change after the Dust Bowl. I use NRI-derived county-level erosion data as the
outcome variable and I use county-level spatial variation of crop intensity in 1930 as the
explanatory variable. Then, I move toward analysis on within-state persistent environmental
impact of the early conservation policies with a regression framework for the grassland
(1933-1940). I use annual county-level panel data on grassland to see how 1930’s crop
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intensity affected the later size of the grassland in any county. To see the within-state
persistent environmental impact of the conservation policy I estimate OLS equations,
ln(Ec) = α0 + α1ln(Crop Intensity)c,1930 + α2Xc + α3Mc,1930 + δs + εc (3.3)
ln(Gc) = α0 + α1ln(Crop Intensity)c,1930 + α2Xc + α3Mc,1930 + δs + εc (3.4)
where c denotes county, s denotes state, E is soil erosion and G is the total area under
pasture, and are at different future points of time (t > 1980). Crop Intensity is a variable
that I create from the 1930’s Agricultural Census. It is a county-level variable showing the
proportion of area in any county under the crops in the program. deltas is a set of state
fixed effects. I include a number of control variables; (Xc) is a vector of time-invariant
controls, (Mc),1930 is a vector of initial conditions, δs is a set of state fixed effects. εc is the
error term. (M)c,1930 includes the initial fraction of prairie grassland in 1920, the fraction of
population in farms, fraction of land under woodland. Xc includes terrain elevation, latitude
and longitude and access to the railroad. εc is the error term. The coefficient α1 captures the
correlation between early conservation policies and later erosion level. Given the skewed
distribution of grassland acreage and crop acreage, I use the natural log of these two
variables. This estimation is cross-sectional, so monotonic transformation to logarithm does
not represent growth in the variables. The sample is balanced in every regression.
3.5.2 Persistent Impact: Instrumental Variable Strategy
Equation 4 and Equation 5 are estimated with cross-sectional analyses. These analyses
can be biased by the unobservables related to the political process and farmers’ attitude
toward soil and land conservation. For example, there can be bias from reverse causality if
farmers are making decisions jointly. To get rid of this omitted variable bias, I use an
instrumental variable strategy. I construct an IV from agro-ecological information of the
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crops derived solely from climatic data, and thus the IV is not related to any socioeconomic
variables. For a causal identification of persistent annual effects of the policy, the empirical
analysis closely follows some previous papers that also study the impact of historical events.
First, Fiszbein, 2017 examines the impact of early agricultural diversity in the 1800s on
economic outcomes in later 1900s. He uses an instrumental variable analysis to see how crop
diversity affected later economic growth. Second, Banerjee and Iyer, 2005 studies the effects
of the early institution on later public good distribution in India and depends on an
instrumental variable coming from the natural transformation of power in between British
Raj and native kings. My identification strategy closely follows these papers where I
construct IV with an exogenous crop intensity variable that is not affected by any rational
human decision.
The FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project provides measures of
maximum attainable yields (in tons per hectare) for different crops based on high spatial
resolution climatic data and crop-specific characteristics. These measures of crop-specific
potential productivity are based on knowledge of climatic features affecting agricultural
production processes; they do not rely on a statistical analysis of production patterns
observed across the world. In addition, though based on climatic records for 1961-1990, they
provide good proxies for historical conditions. I use this potential or attainable yields for
rain-fed conditions and intermediate levels of inputs/technology, as these correspond most
closely to the context under consideration. Figure 6 displays the county-level average values
of potential yields for targeted crops (wheat, corn, rice, cotton and tobacco). To see the
within-state persistent environmental impact of the policy I estimate the same OLS
equations in Equation 4 and Equation 5 using Crop Potential Yield as the IV.
3.5.3 Continuous Policy Impact: Difference-in-Difference Estimating Equation
Next I estimate the annual immediate effects of the farmland conservation policy.
Referring back to the conceptual framework, this corresponds to the effects on the intensive
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margins (Figure 5). For a causal identification of immediate annual effects of the policy, the
empirical analysis closely follows some previous papers that also study the continuous
impacts of historical events. First, Hornbeck, 2012 studies the long-term economic effect of
the Dust Bowl and uses a difference-in-difference analysis with different soil erosion level,
and finds that Dust Bowl had a long-term impact on the Great Plains economy. Second,
Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle, 2004 uses a difference-in-difference setting to understand the
impact of war-induced male labor supply on women labor employment. My identification
strategy closely follows this last paper where I use crop intensity as the continuous treatment
variable.
I identify the causal effect of the conservation policies on the size of the grassland by
exploiting the timing of budget and the spatial variation in the initial county-level targeted
crop intensity extracted from 1930 agricultural census. Federal decisions about whether to
implement land retirement payments to keep acreage below a national allotment closely
follow national factors such as the timing of wars, and so timing of the land-retirement
program is likely to be exogenous to county-level decision on the grassland acreage. For the
continuity of the time variation, I use a continuous variable of annual soil conservation
budget. The idea behind this estimation is similar to Bartik-type instrumental variables; we
interact federal budget decisions with initial county-level variation to get a proxy of
county-level proportion of the budget flow.
The equation to be estimated is:
ln(Gct) = αc + βBt + γ(Treated Crop Intensity)c,1930 ∗Bt + ρXct + εct (3.5)
where c indexes county, t indexes year, αc is the county-specific fixed effect, Bt is the
annual federal budget for soil conservation, Xct is a set of county-level control variables, and
εct is the error term. The coefficient of interest is γ, which corresponds to the interaction
term between the policy timing dummy and crop intensity in 1930. The coefficient captures
whether counties with higher crop acreage in wheat, corn, cotton, tobacco, peanut, and rice
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in 1930 experienced a higher increase in grassland acreage during land retirement program
years. The identifying assumption is that counties with different baseline levels of program
crops would have changed the same after the 1930s if not for the Voluntary Acreage
Allotment. This is the parallel trend assumption. In the regression estimating equation, this
must hold after controlling for differential changes over each period that are correlated with
states and include pre-1930 characteristics.
3.6 Results
Table 3 reports estimated direct effects of the conservation programs on the later
environmental variable, county-level soil erosion on the pastureland. Soil erosion variable has
been regressed on initial targeted crop intensity. Column 1 to column 7 report within-state
year-specific cross-sectional differences. I use potential yield by crop as the instrumental
variable. Results consistently show that initial crop intensity creates a standard significant
variation in the soil erosion. Counties with higher targeted crop intensity in 1930s experience
lower soil erosion level in later years in the pastureland. This relationship is consistent with
our hypothesis. I also report estimated impacts on cropland erosion in Table 4. Impact on
cropland erosion was also affected by early commercial crop intensity. Table 5 reports
estimated persistent impact of the conservation programs on the total pastureland area in
later years. Similarly, we see counties with higher wheat intensity in 1930 has larger area
under pasture. Wheat was the main commercial crop in the study region, and was the main
targeted crop in 1930 in the plains. This result corresponds to our intuitive understanding
that initial high wheat areas have been converted to soil conserving grassland. The results
are persistent over time.
Table 6 presents the main results from estimating equation 6 with a
difference-in-difference setting for total grassland where I derived total grassland using
USDA Historical Land Cover and Land Use Data. We see there is a positive significant effect
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of the land conservation programs on the average annual size of the area under grassland. I
use a dynamic panel model to estimate it because past year’s grassland also may affect this
year’s grassland. The result shows that high initial wheat and corn intensity areas in the
years of high budget will have a higher area of land under grassland. All the regressions are
weighted by farmland area and have state fixed effects. The results systematically vary over
the crops. The impact of wheat and corn intensity is the highest, as expected for the Great
Plains counties. These results suggest that farmers may not invest in soil if there is no
subsidy. This is an important understanding given recent literature on the cost-benefit of
farmland conservation benefits. Table 7 presents main results from estimating equation 3
and 4 with a difference-in-difference setting for a similar variable. I created total soil
conserving land area from the USDA census. Results follow a similar pattern as Table 6.
The robustness in the results suggest there is a strong annual effect of soil conservation
budget on environmental outcomes.
Next, I do the same analysis with East and West of the 100th Meridian line to show
how aridity affected the process of conversion or diversion. Table 8 presents this result. If I
do this split sample analysis, the results suggest that western Great Plains counties have
higher effect from the policy compared to the eastern part. This results make intuitive sense
as mostly low rainfall areas have higher drought intensity.
These results of Tables 6 and 7 establish the significant positive effects of early land
conservation programs on long-run share of grassland and environmental quality and
continuous effect of subsidy on annual soil conserving areas. The effects are mostly
concentrated in wheat growing areas. In this section, I proceed to investigate the underlying
channels by which the economy in general can be affected through this set-aside policy. This
section puts together some assumptions related to the allocation of limited land, and
empirically shows that early farmland conservation policies fostered environmental persistent
quality. Contemporary anecdotal literature suggests that land use adjustment barriers are
excessive tenancy rate, credit access, access to irrigation, farm size (Wenger, 1941). To
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estimate the impact of these factors that may affect land use adjustment, equation 3.5 is
modified to examine heterogeneity in the response. The analysis focuses on variation in the
baseline characteristics in 1930. Table 9 and Table 10 present these results.
Initial farmsize has a positive effect on the environmental effect of the policy. Farmsize
is a proxy of farm’s capacity, and this relationship may shed light on the flexibility of farms
to shift land to grasses. Small farms did not have enough capacity to put land aside from
crops. Higher ratio of tenants have a negative effect on the environment. Property right
plays a role here. Tenants had been a strong barrier to adopt conservation programs in the
Great Plains because tenancy contract duration were mostly annual. Racial identity of the
farmers play a role in the cotton areas because mostly black farmers reside there. Irrigation
plays a positive role in determining the area under grassland. More irrigated areas have
availability of water, and thus conversion might occur as a less important tool. Availability
of non-farm jobs also create a barrier in shifting land to grassland.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper complements recent empirical studies on the implication of early historical
events, offering unique insights on how the existing land uses can affect long-term
environmental performances in the context of land conservation. Farmland conversion is an
important and popular conservation instrument, and constitutes a significant portion of the
farmland conservation budget in the United States of America (Hellerstein, 2017 and Wu and
Babcock, 1999). For example, the 2018 USA federal budget includes $2.1 billion in funding
for the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) to protect 24 million acres of environmentally
sensitive cropland and grassland (US Congressional Budget Office, 2018). The impact of
farmland retirement on harvest acreage is well documented in the literature (Ericksen and
Collins, 1985); however, it is not clear how farmland retirement affects land degradation in
the long run. The primary purpose of farmland retirement is to increase the endowment of
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natural resources for future benefit. However, market pressure and the use of conservation
policy as a supply control instrument make the context complicated. In this paper, I study
the crop-based early conservation policies to understand the impact of supply-control
motivated conservation policies on environmental quality. Most of the studies on land
conservation program in the empirical literature study the Conservation Reserve Program
established in late 1980s (Wachenheim, Lesch, and Dhingra, 2014; Sullivan et al., 2004).
Designing farmland conservation policies is a huge component in fiscal policies in both
USA and developing countries (Jayachandran et al., 2017; Andam et al., 2010; Howlader and
Ando, 2018). Some recent studies compare USA experiences of land retirement with Chinese
experiences (Xiao et al., 2017; Heimlich, 2002; Lohmar et al., 2007). The main concern is
that land conservation may not persist after the removal of state-level subsidies. This study
on the USA experience on subsidized conservation programs could also be applied to
understand the future effect of land retirement in this kind of developing countries, and may
help to design a better contract with landowners.
The short-term understanding of land conservation policies, mostly in developing
countries, is getting attention in environmental economics (Howlader and Ando, 2018; Sims
and Alix-Garcia, 2017; Andam et al., 2010), although, results may hinder the benefits
because of the limited time duration from the event. Land use change takes time to be
visible in the landscape. By analyzing the long-term impact, this paper helps policymakers
to redesign the policy to incorporate these negative consequences arising from the interaction
of supply-control policy instruments with land conservation policy tools.
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3.8 Figures
Figure (3.1) USDA Budget for Soil Conservation
Note: This graph denotes the total financial expenditure on soil conservation by USDA Soil
Conservation Service (currently named as Natural Resource and Conservation Service)
Figure (3.2) Study Area - The Great Plains
Note - States in the Great Plains: Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, North
Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico.
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Figure (3.3) Total Acreage Allotment for Crops
Note: Data Calculated From USDA Bulletin, “Acreage Allotment and Marketing Quota Summary”
1961. Graph denotes the annual crop acreage allotment for the USA. The variation closely follows
the world price movement.
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Figure (3.4) Relationship between Rate of Payment and Crop Intensity in Oklahoma
Note: Data extracted from National Archives at College Park (for more details of the data, see the
appendix). Graph denotes the correlation between Oklahoma counties’ rate of payment per acre
and their 1930 wheat intensity. This shows the rate of payment has a strong positive correlation
with pre-policy crop intensity in Oklahoma. Wheat is Oklahoma’s main crop.
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Figure (3.5) Conceptual Framework
(a) Persistent and Immediate Effect (b) Only Immediate Effect
(c) No Impact (d) Persistent but No Immediate Effect
Note: This graph denotes the four potential cases that might occur as a result of introduction of
farmland conservation policies, as described in the conceptual framework. Panel (a) corresponds
to the case where initial impact does not degrade and later funding also has non-durable impact.
Panel (b) corresponds to the case where grassland is only maintained by flows of funding. Panel (c)
corresponds to the case where farmland conservation policies have no impact. Panel (d) corresponds
to the case where initial impact does not degrade but later funding has no impact. The persistent
impact corresponds to α in the equation 3 and equation 4 in section 5.1; the immediate effect
corresponds to γ in section 5.3.
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Figure (3.6) Potential Yield
Note: Data extracted from FAO-GAEZ. Simulated over only climate variables.
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Figure (3.7) Spatial Variation of Crop Intensity
(a) Corn Intensity (b) Cotton Intensity
(c) Wheat Intensity
Note: County-level crop intensity data extracted from the US Census of Agriculture (1930), Crop
area fraction of total farm area.
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Figure (3.8) Aggregate Changes on the Plains in Agriculture
Data are from the US Census of Agriculture, and reports the log total acres of farmland.
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Figure (3.9) Total Great Plains Harvested Acreage by Crop (1920 - 1960)
Note: Data are from the US Census of Agriculture
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Figure (3.10) Aggregate Changes on the Plains in Crop Acreage (Fraction of Farmland)
Data are from the US Census of Agriculture. Each panel reports values aggregated in each period
for the counties mapped in Figure 2. Panel A reports fraction of total farmland area in cotton; Panel
B reports fraction of total farmland area in corn, Panel C reports fraction of total farmland area in
wheat, Panel D reports fraction of total farmland area in peanut, Panel E reports fraction of total


























































































Figure (3.12) Conversion to National Grassland (1933 - 1941)
Data are from the USFS. Figure shows lands actually purchased and restored to grassland by USFS.
National Grassland units designated by the Secretary of Agriculture and permanently held by the
Department of Agriculture under Title III of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Act.
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Log of county−level AAA allocation
Graphs by Year
Cropland Wind Erosion Rate and AAA allocation
Note: Graphs denoting the correlation between current cropland erosion level and earlier county-level
AAA grant allocation. AAA data is extracted from New Deal database created by Fishback(2016).
Cropland erosion data is extracted from Natural Resource Inventory (provided by USDA-NRCS). X-
axis denotes total funding for AAA in 1933 - 1940. Y-axis denotes log of cropland erosion. This
graph shows that there is no consistent relationship between early AAA budget and later cropland
erosion level.
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Log of county−level AAA allocation
Graphs by Year
Pastureland Wind Erosion Rate and AAA allocation
Note: Graphs denoting the correlation between current pastureland erosion level and earlier county-
level AAA grant allocation. AAA data is extracted from Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2006.
Pastureland erosion data is extracted from Natural Resource Inventory (provided by USDA-NRCS).
X- axis denotes total funding for AAA in 1933 - 1940. Y-axis denotes log of pastureland erosion. This
graph shows that there is a consistent negative relationship between early AAA budget and later
pastureland erosion level. Higher AAA budget is negatively correlated with erosion in pastureland.
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Figure (3.15) Evolution of Grassland in the Great Plains
Note: Data extracted from USGS Historical Land Use and Land Cover database from 1938. This is
a raster data providing information on the grassland.
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Figure (3.16) Evolution of Hayland in the Great Plains
Note: Note: Data extracted from USGS Historical Land Use and Land Cover database from 1938.
This is a raster data providing information on the hayland.
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Figure (3.17) Histogram: 1930’s Average Crop Intensity
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3.9 Tables
Table (3.1) Description of the Variables
Variable Name Description Data Source
Crops Acreage under crops Census of Agriculture 1920 -
1980
Budget Annual Soil Conservation Bud-
get
USDA
Cap on the produc-
tion
Marketing Quota USA Marketing Book
Tenancy Percentage of Tenants Agricultural Census
Landowners Proportion of landowners Agricultural Census
Proportion Black
Farms
Black Farms/Total Farms Agricultural Census
Proportion White
Farms
White Farms/Total Farms Agricultural Census
Farm size Average farm size Agricultural Census
Number of Farms Total Number of Farms Agricultural Census
Population Density Population/acre Agricultural Census
Railway Indication of railway existence Agricultural Census
Woodland Acres under woodland Agricultural Census
Voting Results Proportion of voters democrat Fishback (2006)
Soil Erosion Soil Erosion Index Reconnaissance Erosion Sur-
vey (Hornbeck (2012))
Precipitation Precipitation level PRISM (Monthly)
Temperature Temperature level PRISM (Monthly)
Number of Bank Access to credit Agricultural census
Land Conversion
Map
Map showing targeted conver-
sion areas
National Archives
a Marketing Quota books are manually collected.
b Land conversion map is digitized.
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Table (3.2) Summary Statistics by Census Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
mean mean mean mean mean
Total Population 39612.15 41983.2 46759.26 54496.83 59570.15
County Area 507366.9 511169.3 510570.9 511874.7 511896.9
Total Harvest Area 119377.2 233695.2 113804.6 102326.5 89504.02
Average Farmsize 339.2313 396.2733 503.2128 602.0993 659.8266
Percentage of Tenant 38.98595 37.77527 24.94758 19.17877 12.4364
Cotton Acre 14961.91 3594.977 9646.532 5135.723 3752.886
Tobacco Acre 661.6517 6404.469 643.9849 545.2521 314.4238
Corn Acre 34134.71 30577.72 29326.95 27947.96 21346.51
Wheat Acre 19750.56 27254.5 24615.48 16009.45 14498.25
Peanut Acre 489.6099 3077.987 1138.292 1309.253 512.1492
Rice Acre 230.4426 3342.478 3855.84 706.738 0
Proportion of White .8572825 .8779208 .8847669 .8841911 .887793
Proportion of Black .1207721 .1157882 .1086398 .1049307 .0984421
Share of Cotton Area .035494 .0010697 .0002879 .0156533 .0001126
Share of Tobacco Area .0023297 .0014322 .00003 .0029261 .0000196
Share of Corn Area .091939 .0126678 .0010072 .100676 .0008166
Share of Wheat Area .0368372 .0112129 .0005191 .03483 .000302
Share of Peanut Area .0011256 .0011042 .0000465 .006029 .0000262
Share of Rice Area .0004506 .0011712 .000119 .0020672 0
Observations 2869 2866 2869 2893 2901
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Table (3.3) Persistent Impact of Voluntary Acreage Reduction on Pastureland Erosion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Intensity (1930) 0.128 -1.301*** -1.161*** -0.873*** -1.433*** -1.841*** -2.292***
(0.217) (0.160) (0.154) (0.133) (0.162) (0.197) (0.207)
Constant 0.00113 0.534*** 0.489*** 0.389*** 0.591*** 0.783*** 0.923***
(0.132) (0.0322) (0.0319) (0.0278) (0.0339) (0.0417) (0.0441)
IV -1.277 -2.815*** -2.595*** -2.122*** -3.116*** -4.401*** -5.037***
(0.841) (0.268) (0.264) (0.234) (0.286) (0.366) (0.387)
Constant 0.491 0.734*** 0.685*** 0.563*** 0.825*** 1.145*** 1.315***
(0.313) (0.0437) (0.0440) (0.0394) (0.0480) (0.0622) (0.0660)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 685 694 703 705 741 754 775
R-squared 0.313 0.087 0.075 0.058 0.095 0.104 0.137
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Regression coefficients from equation 3 and 4. Extracted from regressing log of erosion area under
pastureland in any county in 1982-2012 on the county-level targeted crop intensity in 1930. Regressions are
weighted by area under farmland in 1930. Erosion Database created by USDA NRCS. Agroclimatic potential
yield for wheat, corn and cotton has been used as IV.
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Table (3.4) Persistent Impact of Voluntary Acreage Reduction on Cropland Erosion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Intensity (1930) -0.505* -1.220*** -1.208*** -1.015*** -1.296*** -1.276*** -1.622***
(0.288) (0.212) (0.210) (0.199) (0.198) (0.208) (0.217)
Constant 1.058*** 1.592*** 1.489*** 1.316*** 1.363*** 1.389*** 1.438***
(0.156) (0.0449) (0.0446) (0.0422) (0.0420) (0.0441) (0.0460)
IV -15.40*** -5.417*** -5.075*** -4.465*** -4.844*** -5.035*** -5.454***
(2.267) (0.431) (0.412) (0.382) (0.383) (0.404) (0.419)
Constant 6.387*** 2.182*** 2.032*** 1.801*** 1.861*** 1.918*** 1.976***
(0.848) (0.0732) (0.0703) (0.0653) (0.0654) (0.0690) (0.0716)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 792 794 794 791 792 791 790
R-squared 0.199 0.040 0.040 0.032 0.051 0.045 0.066
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Regression coefficients from equation 3 and 4. Extracted from regressing log of erosion area under cropland
in any county in 1982-2012 on the county-level targeted crop intensity in 1930. Regressions are weighted by area
under farmland in 1930. Erosion Database created by USDA NRCS. Agroclimatic potential yield for wheat, corn
and cotton has been used as IV.
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Table (3.5) Persistent Impact of Voluntary Acreage Reduction on Total Pastureland
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Cotton_AC -0.00480 -0.00429 -0.00423 -0.00424 -0.00342 -0.00331 -0.00297
(0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0140)
Wheat_AC 0.0219** 0.0214** 0.0218** 0.0233** 0.0231** 0.0225** 0.0236**
(0.00942) (0.00932) (0.00924) (0.00932) (0.00930) (0.00912) (0.00926)
Corn_AC -0.0110 -0.0130 -0.0139 -0.0135 -0.0145 -0.0138 -0.0151
(0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0172) (0.0175)
Constant 5,647** 5,252** 4,919** 5,120** 5,064** 4,981** 5,063**
(2,316) (2,292) (2,273) (2,292) (2,287) (2,242) (2,277)
Observations 820 820 820 820 820 820 820
R-squared 0.276 0.276 0.278 0.278 0.279 0.276 0.276
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV 0.0951** 0.0953*** 0.0968*** 0.100*** 0.0982*** 0.0956*** 0.0994***
(0.0372) (0.0369) (0.0366) (0.0370) (0.0368) (0.0361) (0.0367)
Constant -3,474 -4,070 -4,591 -4,569 -4,485 -4,299 -4,618
(4,621) (4,580) (4,549) (4,592) (4,576) (4,482) (4,561)
Observations 820 820 820 820 820 820 820
R-squared 0.222 0.219 0.218 0.217 0.220 0.218 0.215
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Regression coefficients from equation 3 and 4. Extracted from regressing total pastureland in any county in
1982-2012 on the county-level targeted crop intensity in 1930. Regressions are weighted by area under farmland in
1930. Erosion Database created by USDA NRCS. Agroclimatic potential yield for wheat has been used as IV.
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Table (3.6) Continuous Impact of Farmland Conservation on Total Grassland
(1)
VARIABLES Model
Budget*Initial Wheat Intensity 5.79e-10***
(8.09e-11)
Budget*Initial Corn Intensity 4.73e-10***
(8.97e-11)
Budget*Initial Cotton Intensity 1.40e-10
(9.90e-11)






Number of FIPS 820
R-squared 0.007
State-Year FE Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Outcome variable is calculated from USGS
Historical Land Use Data for the USA. Difference-
in-difference results with budget variation interacted
with initial crop intensity.
91
Table (3.7) Continuous Impact of Farmland Conservation on Total Soil Conserving Land
(1)






























t statistics in parentheses
a Note: Outcome variable is calculated from USDA agricultural census
(summation of all land under soil conserving grasses for which USDA
paid farmers). USDA annual finacial assistance conservation budget
has been interacted with 1930’s initial crop intensity. Variables have
been converted to logarithm for skewness.
92
Table (3.8) Exploring Spatial Heterogeneity
(1) (2)














Number of FIPS 463 357
State-Year FE Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Outcome variable is calculated from USDA agricultural census (summation of all land under soil conserving
grasses for which USDA paid farmers). USDA annual finacial assistance conservation budget has been interacted
with 1930’s initial crop intensity. Variables have been converted to logarithm for skewness.
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Table (3.9) Heterogeneious Treatment Effect
(1) (2) (3)



















Constant 0.00165*** 0.00167*** 0.00167***
(0.000195) (0.000195) (0.000195)
Observations 34,440 34,440 34,440
R-squared 0.015 0.008 0.007
Number of FIPS 820 820 820
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Outcome variable is calculated from USDA agricultural census (summa-
tion of all land under soil conserving grasses for which USDA paid farmers).
USDA annual finacial assistance conservation budget has been interacted with
1930’s initial crop intensity. Variables have been converted to logarithm for
skewness.
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Table (3.10) Heterogeneious Treatment Effect
(1) (2)

















Number of FIPS 820 820
State-Year FE Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Outcome variable is calculated from USDA agricultural census
(summation of all land under soil conserving grasses for which USDA
paid farmers). USDA annual finacial assistance conservation budget has
been interacted with 1930’s initial crop intensity. Variables have been
converted to logarithm for skewness.
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Table (3.11) Consequences on Conservation Reserve Program Uptake
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CRP 1986 CRP 1989 CRP 1992 CRP 1995 CRP 1998
Corn Intensity -1,288 -44,784*** -47,725*** -47,753*** -37,233**
(2,375) (14,381) (15,730) (15,830) (15,794)
Wheat Intensity 1,431 74,497*** 99,187*** 99,713*** 100,680***
(1,835) (11,112) (12,154) (12,231) (12,204)
Cotton Intensity -1,351 10,528 17,426 19,111 8,972
(2,142) (12,967) (14,184) (14,274) (14,241)
Constant 5,713*** 27,328*** 29,537*** 29,668*** 27,232***
(609.8) (3,692) (4,038) (4,064) (4,054)
Observations 820 820 820 820 820
R-squared 0.081 0.165 0.210 0.209 0.237
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Outcome variable is calculated from USDA agricultural census (summation of all land
under soil conserving grasses for which USDA paid farmers). USDA annual finacial assistance
conservation budget has been interacted with 1930’s initial crop intensity. Variables have been
converted to logarithm for skewness.
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CHAPTER 4
UNDERSTANDING THE FORMATION OF LOCAL
ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS: HISTORICAL
EVIDENCE FROM SOIL CONSERVATION
DISTRICTS
4.1 Introduction
Early studies in institutional economics documents that the collective action model is an
important instrument to manage small-scale local natural resources or commons (Commons,
1931; McCay and Acheson, 1990; Veblen, 1898). As economies develop, private ownership
starts to dominate (Shleifer, 1998), but some local resources still naturally depend on a
collective management system (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom, 2010). While on the one hand,
classical theory shows how rational economic modeling predicts ‘tragedy of the commons’
(Hardin, 1968), several scholars have argued that people cooperate to manage local resources
under certain conditions and social norms (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom, 2010; Ahn,
Ostrom, and Walker, 2003).1. Findings of these studies suggest that identifying the factors
that drive people to cooperate can enrich our understanding of local institutions in economic
development. This is even more important under current climate risk, as local institutions
help to reduce climate uncertainty. This paper asks, what are the underlying heterogeneities
that determine the speed of formation and success of local institutions?
The early economic literature on common-pool resources (CPR) use examples from
fisheries or grazing to show the importance of bargaining power, defined property rights, and
state intervention to manage CPR (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; Gilles and Jamtgaard,
1The tragedy of the commons is a situation in a common-pool resource where individual users behave
contrary to the common good of all users by depleting or spoiling that resource. The theory originated in an
essay written in 1833 by the British economist William Forster Lloyd. The concept became widely known as
the ”tragedy of the commons” due to an article written by Garrett Hardin (Hardin, 1968).
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1981). Over the decades, the role of local institutions in solving the collective action problem
has been addressed by different theories with contrasting implications and structural
hypotheses. Ostrom, 2002 outlines two theoretical puzzles: the size of the group and the
heterogeneity in the performance of the common-pool resource institution. Due to the lack of
empirical evidence, this established theoretical literature cannot predict when people are
likely to create local institutions. Despite the richness of the literature over the last couple of
decades, there is limited empirical evidence relating to this research question. Multiple forces
are involved in the formation of land-related institutions and identification of the effect is
challenging; it is not surprising that empirical studies have been sparse and inconclusive.
This paper identifies the factors behind the formation of a local environmental
institution, Soil Conservation Districts, that manages topsoil erosion in farmland of the
United States. Topsoil is a common-pool resource that move across farm plots, and farmers
need to take joint decisions to take care of their land. This is especially true where wind
erosion is high (McConnell, 1983; Barbier, 1990). Soil Conservation Districts (SCDs) evolved
in the American landscape after the devastating experience of the Dust Bowl. Blowing
topsoil from excessive farming and grassland destruction in the Great Plains created this
tragedy of the commons. One of the most important agrarian institutional change after the
Dust Bowl was to create this farmer-governed institution to manage topsoil CPR and to
reduce the impact of wind erosion on farmland. The SCD is an independent local unit where
supervisors are elected through systematic election by landowners. This paper draws
evidence from the numerous SCDs operating in the USA to empirically test theoretical
hypotheses around the formation of local institutions.
To do so, I compile a novel primary dataset on Soil Conservation Districts from the
annual reports deposited in the National Archives (Helms, 1992). Post-Dust Bowl federal
farmland policies instructed states to organize local soil conservation institutions. In 1937,
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act was passed, and this federal law directed
all states to have state-specific laws to support soil conservation in the farmland. Every state
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passed their own law following the federal suggestions in a couple of years. However, the
time it took to set up SCDs on a county-by-county basis ranged from 1 to 40 years. I study
the determinants of the speed of formation of this federal-backed yet locally-organized set of
common-pool resource institutions and shed light on the theoretical puzzles discussed in
CPR literature (Ostrom et al., 1999).
I study counties affected by the Dust Bowl in the Great Plains: Montana, South
Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, Kansas, and Nebraska. I collect data from the SCD
annual reports on the initial date of operation, referendum, and the initial size of the SCDs.
SCDs mostly overlap with county boundaries, so I use county boundaries as the geographic
unit for this study. I use the USDA Soil Erosion Index issued before SCD formation as the
primary factor to compare the heterogeneities among different groups. Explanatory variables
are created from climate data, agricultural census, and geographic calculations; these include
number of farms, average farm size, percentage of failed cropland, the proportion of tenancy,
distance to land grant colleges, and climate shocks to explain the underlying variation to
create a local environmental institution. I also use area under irrigation and shelterbelt as
these two are the main substitutes to farmland conservation in generating soil moisture.
To guide the empirical framework, I build a simple economic model showing how factors
may influence the initiation of the SCDs. The model identifies the key externalities and
shows how they can be solved by cooperation among farmers. The model predicts that 1)
climate shock and soil erosion, 2) heterogeneity in farming characteristics, and 3) farm
capacity are the primary determinants behind soil conservation districts. I explore how
transaction cost in organizing farmers to cooperate may generate the difference in timing of
formation (Ayres, Edwards, and Libecap, 2017).
I use duration analysis to explore spatial and temporal characteristics of counties that
accelerate the adoption of SCDs and see how social, political, and economic factors matter in
the decision sequence. I use descriptive, parametric, semi-parametric, and non-parametric
approaches to analyze the situation and compare the results. I start with a descriptive
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Kaplan-Meier model, exploring both parametric and nonparametric models. For part of the
analysis, I also use discrete choice models (logit). My econometric framework uses both
time-varying and time-invariant variables in both the Weibull Model (Accelerated Failure
Time) and Cox Proportional Hazard model. I also consider the presence of unobservable
heterogeneity. Using this duration framework, I find that counties are more likely to create a
SCD if 1) soil erosion is high, 2) county farm characteristics and population density favor
coordination, and 3) transaction cost is low.
Local institutions play a significant role in coordinating natural resource management
and in helping communities to reduce the uncertain effects of environmental shocks.
Understanding the determinants of the formation of local institutions helps us to identify the
probability of success of an institution in a particular setting. In this paper, I advance this
literature by providing the first empirical evidence through survival analysis to evaluate the
factors behind the formation of a widespread and sustainable local institutions. Case studies
like this paper should give ideas on which variables have an impact on the formation of local
institutions that manage topsoil erosion and farmland conservation, as well as how to design
incentive policies to mitigate the possibilities of inequality.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Local Institutions to Mitigate CPR Exploitation
Early studies on institutional mechanisms state how public policy should be designed to
provide an efficient public good (Samuelson, 1954). Serious decline of natural grazing lands
in the West has generated an intellectual debate around the effective management of natural
resources. The tragedy of the commons model predicts that the overexploitation or
degradation of natural resources is unavoidable (Hardin, 1968). Other early neoclassical
economics studies also find that bargaining and property rights can mitigate the problem of
overuse and exploitation of natural resources (Coase, 1960). Property rights are the social
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institutions that define the range of privileges granted to individuals to specific assets, such
as parcels of land or water. For example, Coasian bargaining theorem states how
well-defined property right can sustain the system. Transaction cost theory suggests that
institutional settings may help to reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). Because of
the important social role of property rights, the survey of economics and economic history
states how arrangements of property right affect wasteful resource management through the
establishment of local institutions (North, 1991; North, 1984).
Local institutions play a major role in coordinating natural resource management and
in helping communities to reduce uncertain effects of environmental shocks (Ostrom, 1992;
Bromley, 1990; Blomquist, 1992). For example, under the leadership of Elinor Ostrom, a
group of social scientists collected rich case studies from 5000 examples from different
disciplines about CPR management all over the world to explain the structure of the
resource system, the attributes, and behaviors of the appropriators, the rules that the
communities are using, and the outcomes resulting from the behavior. Ostrom outlined the
principles of local resource institutions: clearly defined boundaries, congruence, arrangement,
monitoring, sanction, conflict resolution mechanism, defined rights, and payoff distribution.2
Institutional design is especially important under the risk of climate change where
strong local institutions have been asserted as a tool for climate resilience (Agrawal, 2008).
Theoretical studies identify the relative importance of different factors underlying the
formation of local institutions and call for the need for empirical studies to understand the
heterogeneity (Ostrom, 2002; Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern, 2003; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999;
Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). However, empirical estimation of the importance of factors is
relatively complicated because of the lack of real examples (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001).
2In an influential thesis, Olson, 2009 says that if a commodity has pure jointness of supply, group size has
a positive effect on the probability that the good will be provided. From the 1970’s, a group of social scientists
started to work on the dilemma of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1992; Bromley, 1990; Blomquist, 1992).
Ostrom, 2002 outlines two theoretical puzzles: the size of the group and the heterogeneity in the performance
of the common-pool resource institution. Ostrom hypothesizes that there might be a curvilinear relationship
between group size and performance. Neither firm size nor heterogeneity can have a uniform effect on the
institution, and so this needs empirical evidence.
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The aggregate gains from reducing common pool problems through the establishment of
property rights are unlikely to be controversial; however, conflicts over distribution can be
critical if there are important heterogeneities among bargaining groups.
One important implication of common-pool resource management is farmland
conservation and topsoil erosion. Topsoil is a common-pool resource with strong externalities
among neighboring plots, and farmers need to take joint decisions to take care of their land.
This is especially true where wind erosion is high (McConnell, 1983, Barbier, 1990). Each
farmer is cooperators in this common-pool resource. If all farmers are not collectively
deciding how to manage topsoil, the group fails to reduce soil erosion. The on-site and
off-site costs of high topsoil erosion include foregone future productivity, productivity loss in
congruent plots, health hazards, and in extreme cases, a natural disaster like the Dust Bowl.
4.2.2 Formation of Soil Conservation Districts to Manage Topsoil Erosion
Land conservation in the United States of America can be traced back to Yellowstone
National Park, established in 1871. But these early efforts were motivated by wildlife and
nature conservation. Farmland or soil conservation was not a priority agenda (Hays, 1999).
The conservation of working land (or soil conservation) at first came into federal discussion
in 1914 through the Smith-Lever Act. This gives power to land grant universities to
disseminate farmland conservation knowledge through publishing bulletins/reports by
Agricultural Extension Service. However, this law had a negligible impact on farmers.
Primarily to fill in the high European demand for wheat, and under the conditions of the
Homestead Act, farmers continued to uproot native grassland from the Great Plains region.
Grassland is an essential component in the Great Plains ecosystem, and this disturbed the
biological soil organic system (Webb, 1959). The result was slow ecological destruction.
In the 1920s, after the World War, discussion of farmland conservation began; mainly
because of the continuous pressure from a soil scientist in the USDA named Hugh Bennett
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(Bennett, 1928).3 Gradually, the USDA realized there was a missing connection between
farmers and the Soil Conservation Service (SCS). To make farmers more concerned about
their own soil, the USDA proposed to make a local institution in the communities such that
farmers themselves would create the institution. Farmers would be responsible for planning
their conservation with the assistance of the SCS. The federal government would be
accountable to provide technical and financial aid. States started to adopt the law in 1937.4
The creation of an SCD in a given county was referendum based, and only landlords were
eligible to vote. Three external institutions would help farmers once they formed an SCD:
the SCS would provide technical assistance; the Extension Service would provide educational
programs; the Work Projects Administration would provide financial aid. The US currently
has more than 3000 SCDs, and mostly these SCDs coincide with county administrative
borders. Only Nebraska created SCDs according to watershed boundaries (Manale et al.,
2018).
SCDs obtained funds from assessments, contributions, earnings from equipment
operations, and state and county appropriations. SCDs have actively promoted programs to
make farmers aware of erosion hazards. To a great extent, SCDs identify soil conservation
methods and farm plans to help individual farmers. SCDs are still the primary local unit for
disseminating knowledge of soil conservation in counties. The primary purpose of the SCDs
was to design conservation survey of the farm plots, assign and suggest essential conservation
3Economic depression in the 1920s helped him to suggest (from 1927) that lower price in the world
market, an excess supply of commodities can be solved by buying submarginal land and take them out of
production. In the 1930s, the Dust Bowl helped to prioritize soil conservation programs. Bennett, 1928
suggested taking marginal land out of production as a solution to control production as well as soil erosion.
Under his leadership, USDA did a detailed soil survey to understand the implication of erosion in 1931-1933.
FDR got elected in 1933, and in first 100 days, he established First New Deal. Land Utilization policies
(purchasing submarginal eroded farmland) was a big part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of New Deal in
1933. The initial plan to conserve soil was two-folded: a) buy submarginal land (set-aside program), b) show
farmers soil conservation techniques through demonstration plots.
4On April 27, 1935 Congress passed Public Law 74-46, in which it recognized that "the wastage of soil
and moisture resources on farm, grazing, and forest lands . . . is a menace to the national welfare," and it
directed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) as a permanent agency
in the USDA. The Department published a model state law in May 1936 which would authorize farmers to
organize soil conservation districts.
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techniques (both short and long run) based on the surveyed soil type.5 SCDs do not define a
right to topsoil or restrict farmers from overexploitation. SCDs only monitor the
arrangement of the soil conservation, teach farmers how to do heavy practices, and
coordinate farmers for future planning.
4.3 Analytic Framework
In this section I lay out a conceptual model of farmers’ production decision that closely
follows previous literature around the effect of soil erosion in farm economics (McConnell,
1983 and Barbier, 1990). Under the regularity assumptions of the production function, it is
possible to predict the effects of spatial and temporal farm characteristics on the formation
of a local institution to mitigate soil erosion. I start with an open access model for farmers
and then consider the nature of negative externalities coming from the topsoil erosion. Then,
I extend the model to include the possibilities of institutional arrangement to solve the
problems of these externalities.
Farmers maximize personal farm profit, π. Land is divided into n parcels,
i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n. Assuming only one crop is produced without loss of generality. q = f(z, x) is
the output production function where z is an input package where some inputs are soil
conserving, x is the topsoil depth, and r denotes the discount rate. x flows from one plot to
another. Remember, this is not a rights-based framework. Farmers use their part of the soil
depth and transfer that to the next plot.
With multiple owners, topsoil is extracted according to individual owner benefits.






5See Appendix for a detailed management plan in Papil Soil Conservation District in Nebraska as a
sample.
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Xt+1 = g(zt, Xt) (4.2)
The important insight from this framework is that the first-order condition and optimal








: how the farmer’s
yield function changes with soil health and input use, and how the soil transition from one
plot to another plot changes with input use and soil health. There are two different social
problems from this open-access model: farmers’ current soil extraction may have a negative
benefit on his own future profit (on-site cost) and there is a neighborhood effect of soil
erosion from one plot to another (off-site cost) (Hansen and Libecap, 2004; McConnell, 1983).
The literature also mentions that a big barrier to internalizing externality is the knowledge
gap. Some soil conservation techniques are labor and skill intensive, and farmers need
assistance to learn them (McConnell, 1983).
Now, an SCD forms only when collective action will give more aggregate benefit than
this private action. For an optimal management plan at the social planner level, the decision
of soil extraction include all the nearby parcels. There is a cost of this coordination and we
can denote that by c(v(µi)), and this varies over the plots. Following the literature, we can








Xt+1 = g(zt, Xt) (4.4)
for i = 1,2,....,n
The social planner, in the second case, chooses the optimal soil extraction path that
distributes benefit among the participants. The farmers will participate in creating a local
institution to internalize the external cost only if an individual farmer’s share of aggregate
benefit is greater than the benefit they get from uncoordinated action (individual rationality
or participation constraint).
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The likelihood of agreement of institutions at any point of time depends on a number of
factors. All things being equal, the greater the size of the anticipated aggregate benefits of
institutional change, the more likely new property rights will be sought and adopted
(Libecap and Wiggins, 1984).6 There are three sets of variables that may influence this
adoption: farm characteristics, production uncertainty and unobserved variables.
First, we expect that erosion level will be an important factor in institutional formation.
Second, average farm size may affect SCD formation because farms with smaller size need to
feed their family before sparing land and labor to conservation. Third, the prevalence of
tenants may slow or hasten SCD formation. On the other hand, tenants help to reduce the
labor cost of conserving soil. Fourth, shelterbelt planting and percent of area under
irrigation are substitutes for soil conservation districts, and should be tested as an indicator
of alternative sources of soil moisture. Fifth, population density or racial composition, may
delay the adoption process.
Sixth, Uncertainty associated with the production function (2) and (3) may influence
the decision process; SCD formation is more likely to happen when the probability of erosion
from Dust Bowl is high. Seventh, climate shock may affect the speed of formation because
SCD helps to reduce climate uncertainty. Finally, transaction cost, such as farm size and
percentage of farms in the county, or distance to land grant colleges may influence the
formation.7
4.4 Duration Model
Duration model has been widely used in land economics to understand the variation in
the timing of events (Ando, 1999; Wrenn, Klaiber, and Newburn, 2017; Bulan, Mayer, and
Somerville, 2009; Dawkins, Shen, and Sanchez, 2005). This paper extends this previous
6SCD cooperators get some financial assistance to adopt conservation practices too. From that sense,
SCD is a mixture of Pigouvian subsidy model and Coasian bargaining models.
7From the 1970s, water quality also became a large part of the decision process in the soil conservation.
Our study period ended in 1957, so we do not include "distance to water bodies" as a potential variable.
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literature by placing the duration framework within the context of collective action in
farmland conservation in the USA. Following the analytic framework, we are interested in
estimating the effects of covariates on the creation of a SCD in the Great Plains. I use a
hazard function to approximate the probability of formation of a SCD within a short
interval, conditional on surviving up to the starting up to the interval. I allow the hazard
function to depend on both time varying and time invariant covariates. Duration models
take account of the fact that an action taken in period t implies the action was not taken in
any previous period, which is the essence of an optimal stopping investment decision (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994).
Defining a duration precisely requires a time origin, a time scale, and a precise
definition of the event ending the duration. The duration spell is the number of months that
a county takes to open any SCD in the boundary. In each period t the landowners come
together and decide whether or not to start a SCD to reduce the soil erosion. The decision
to convert to a SCD has been based on factors that vary at the county level. 8 In this
analysis, T is the length of time before the SCD occurs. The cumulative distribution
function of T is defined by:
F (t) = P (T ≤ 0); t ≥ 0 (4.5)
The survivor function is defined by,
S(t) = 1− F (t) = P (T > t) (4.6)
Given that the spell has lasted until time t, this is the probability that it will end in the
next interval of time. As we are assuming T is continuous, we can get the probability density
function. Denoting the density of T by f(t)
8For some counties month is missing from the report, so we will do a discrete duration model for the full
dataset.
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P (t ≤ T < t+ h|T ≥ t) (4.7)
is the probability of forming a SCD in the interval. The hazard function is defined by:
λ(t) = lim
h→0






where f(t) denotes the density of
T
. The lambda(t) represents the rate of conversion of the collective action group (SCD)
occurring in the time interval dt given that it has not occurred prior to that time. All
probabilities can be computed using this hazard model. In the models that follow, we define
f(t) and S(t) to be a function of independent variables X and parameter vector β and choose








[(1− S(ti, Xβ)]1−λi (4.9)
We can generalize the model by allowing the hazard rate to vary over individual SCDs.
If SCDs in fact are different from each other in ways that can be measured, then their
formation date should vary in some deterministic way.
I used non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates to explore the shape of the overall
hazard function. Kaplan-Meier is a descriptive way to explore hazard function, and cannot
estimate the effects of covariates. Parameterizing the hazard function is a way to account for
this heterogeneity. I estimate a parametric model with a Weibull distribution because it
captures the time-varying factors and unobservable heterogeneity. The Weibull model
implies that the hazard function is monotonically decreasing when p < 1 and increasing
when p > 1. Thus, the Weibull naturally incorporates a knowledge effect. The Weibull
distribution is a relatively simple way to capture duration dependence.9
9On the assumption that the waiting time to each SCD formation is independent random variables, the
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We start by examining different parametrization of the likelihood function. Since we do
not have left censoring, we just consider normal duration models. We also include
time-varying covariates. This branch of parametric survival models are known as
“accelerated failure time models,” which specify the distribution of duration times as follows:
Y = X′β + σε (4.10)
Here, Y is the log of duration, X is a vector of covariates, β is the estimated parameter
vector, ε is the error term and σ is the estimated scale parameter. Different parametric
models can be derived by imposing different distributional assumptions on ε. If ε is
distributed as extreme value and σ = 1, (4) reduces to an exponential model. Similarly, if σ
= 0.5 and ε is distributed as extreme value, (4) reduces to the Rayleigh distribution. The
Weibull distribution is a more general distribution that allows for positive or negative
duration dependence, with the degree of duration dependence captured by the estimated
parameter, σ. When 1/σ ≤ 1, the baseline hazard function monotonically decreases with
time (negative duration dependence), and when 1/σ ≥ 1, the baseline hazard function
monotonically increases with time (positive duration dependence).
For more flexible duration modelling, I use a non-parametric Cox proportional hazard
model because that model makes no assumption about the baseline hazard. The baseline
hazard shifts proportionally with changes in the variables in the model. Xi(t) denote the
value of a vector of covariates for individual i at time or duration t. λ0t is a baseline hazard
function common to all observations. Then the proportional hazard model is,
λ(t) = θiλ0(t)exp(β′Xit)
SCD formation began in 1936 and I have data from the beginning so there is no left
censoring. All areas eventually developed SCDs so there is no right censoring either.
likelihood function describing the interval lengths is the product of the destiny functions of the waiting time.
The assumption of the independence will be relaxed later with a spatial modeling.
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In one set of results I use discrete time Duration model in the Cox proportional hazard
model to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity (fragility). Cox (1972) proposed an extension
of the proportional hazard model to discrete time by working with the conditional odds of







Here λ(tj|xi) is the hazard at time tj for an individual with covariate values xi, λ0(tj) is
the baseline hazard at time tj, and exp(xb) is the relative risk associated with covariate
values xi. Taking logs, we obtain a model on the logit of the hazard or conditional
probability of dying at tj given survival up to that time,
logitλ(tj|xi) = αj + xb (4.12)
where αj = logitλ0(tj) is the logit of the baseline hazard and xi′β is the effect of the
covariates on the logit of the hazard. Note that the model essentially treats time as a
discrete factor by introducing one parameter αj for each possible time of formation tj.
Interpretation of the parameters β associated with the other covariates follows along the
same lines as in logistic regression. 10
For a more relaxed estimation, we estimate the hazard model with the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity. We can write the hazard rate for each observation as
λv(t,X) = θ(t,X|v) = θ(t,X)v (4.13)
where θ(t,X) is the hazard function with unobserved differences in a multiplicative
scaling factor, v. This is a random variable and independently distributed of X and t. In the
discrete time proportional hazards model, the model specification follows directly from above.
10For the discrete time Proportional Hazard model, we follow Gamma distributions and estimate the
hazard function using STATA command pgmhaz8 and hshaz to estimate discrete time duration models.
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The standard cloglog model generalizes to:
cloglog[p(t,X|β, v)] = D(t) + β′X + u (4.14)
where D(t) characterizes the baseline hazard function. The logistic hazard regression
model is typically generalized in an analogous way:
logit[p(t,X|β, v)] = D(t) + β′X + u (4.15)
where the ‘error’ term is a random variable with mean zero and finite variance. These
are random intercept models where randomness is characterized using some parametric
distribution. We follow Gamma Frailty models for unobserved heterogeneity.
4.5 Data Construction and Summary Statistics
To disentangle the relative contribution of different factors towards formation of the soil
conservation districts, I construct a dataset that involves both primary data extraction from
historical Soil Conservation Districts’ Annual Reports and compilation of factors from
various secondary sources. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 360 counties in the
Great Plains. I am focusing on the six Great Plains states: Montana, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas and Wyoming. Study area is shown in Figure 1. 11 To have
consistent units of observation over time, I follow Hornbeck, 2012 to adjust all data to 1910
boundaries.12
Characteristics of the SCDs’ location were obtained from NRCS. Figure 2 to Figure 7
provide maps of the SCDs in the six states, and show that the SCD boundaries mostly
overlap with county boundaries. This overlapping was not in any federal or state level
11Future version of the paper will include the other four states in the Great Plains: Oklahoma, Texas,
New Mexico and Colorado. However, power analysis for the Cox proportional hazards model with continuous
co-variates shows the sample size is more than enough to detect the effect (using STATA package "stpower")
12ICPSR provides this agricultural census data after adjustment.
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requirements, but the evolution of the SCDs follow existing administrative boundaries.
There are some counties where initially more than one SCD evolved but eventually
consolidated. For those cases, to have consistency, I take the first SCD created in a county in
case there are multiple SCDs within the county boundaries.
States passed the laws that authorized SCD formation in different years. Thus, the
"starting time" for duration analysis varies by state. I collect state policy timing from the
states from the state-specific Soil Conservation and Domestic Law reports. Table 1 shows
the policy timing for the six states in my dataset. Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota and
Nebraska passed the authorizing law in 1937, Montana in 1939 and Wyoming in 1941. USDA
asked all SCDs to submit annual reports to USDA showing detailed progress in soil
conservation. The reports are arranged to show the progress and future plan for the soil
conservation activities. The reports are deposited in the National Archives at UMD-College
Park (RG 114). I collected these reports and extracted the information on the formation of
SCDs from the first annual reports.
I use the gap in the timing between the policy (state law) and time of the formation of
the SCDs (event) to study the factors behind variation in the lag from policy to event. I
record the length of that lag (termed the "spell") in months. The final sample for this paper
consists of 360 counties, who developed a SCD during the period 1937 to 1956. From the
initial date of the policy, we follow the counties until their date of SCD formation and record
the length of that spell in months. Using this database, we examine several quantities of
interest related to SCD formation. The distribution of spell length is plotted in a histogram
(Figure 9 in months and Figure 10 in years). The distribution shows there is wide variation
to be explained.
The explanatory variables come mainly from the Census of Agriculture, Census of
Population, and county data books. These include percentage of farms operated under
tenant farmers, farm size, total number of farms, proportion of area under farmland,
proportion of area with cropland failure. I use population density from the Population
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Census. The agricultural census has been collected after every four years, so I used the
’ipolate’ command in STATA to extrapolate annual variables with a linear extrapolation.
The variables are summarized in Tables 3.
I also include some geographic variables. I use the distance to the land-grant colleges as
a proxy for extension service. Name of the Land-grant colleges: Montana State University
(Gallatin, MT), North Dakota State University (Fargo, ND), South Dakota State University
(Brookings, SD), University of Nebraska-Lincoln (Lincoln, NE), Kansas State University
(Manhattan, KS), University of Wyoming (Laramie, WY). I construct a county-to-county
distance variable to create a dummy for the 100-mile buffer of the land-grant colleges. I take
soil erosion data from Hornbeck (Hornbeck, 2012), and counties are divided into medium,
low and high erosion areas. This dataset misses some county erosion level, and for those I
impute the erosion index from state-level average. Figure 14, figure 15 and figure 16 show
the variation in the erosion level. I construct the drought index (Palmer Severity Drought
Index) from 1930 to 1960 using temperature and precipitation data from PRISM (Daly et al.,
2000). I use racial composition of farmers from the 1935 agricultural census.
Two main alternative methods to increase soil moisture are irrigation and shelterbelts
(agroforestry). I collect county-level area under irrigation in 1935 from USDA agricultural
census. Data on area under shelterbelt is not readily available. I collect and manually
extract county-level area under "Great Plains Shelterbelt Project" from the project reports
deposited in the regional archives in Kansas (RG 114).
Table 2 displays the name and source of the variables used in the paper. I display the
mean of all census years in Table 3. As Table 3 suggests, the percentage of people who are
black in the Great Plains is very. Also, tenancy rate is decreasing over time and farm size is
increasing. Population density is stable over time. The distribution of SCD across soil erosion
types are not homogeneous (Figure 14-16). Also, crop failure has substantial variation over
space (Figure 1). Table 4 suggests that an average SCD takes 79 months time to form.
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4.6 Results and Discussion
My discussion of the results starts with some descriptive analyses. I use non-parametric
Kaplan-Meier estimates to explore the shape of the hazard and survivor functions. Figure 18
to Figure 24 show these for the full sample. I also present results by state. Figure 18 shows
the fraction of counties without any SCD for a certain amount of months. We can see the
speed slows down over time and has a significant variation. I also present the failure function
and Nelson-Aalen Cumulatative Hazard Function. The Nelson–Aalen estimator is a
non-parametric estimator of the cumulative hazard rate function to estimate the cumulative
number of expected events. Figure 21 shows the cumulative hazard estimate. This is concave
shape, and shows that the hazard rate is increasing over time. This might be a case of
increasing knowledge dissemination or increasing cooperative behavior among the SCDs.
These figures suggest that SCDs were created at an increasing rate, the last one in our
sample took 188 months. One limitation of non-parametric Kaplan-Meier curves is that it
cannot analyze the effect of covariates. For that, we need to move to parametric survival
models or the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox PH)) to estimate covariate-adjusted
survival.
To determine the best fitting functional form, I examined Akaike’s information criterion
(AIC), calculated as: 2(log likelihood)+(p k), where p = number of parameters estimated
and k = constant chosen by the analyst. Other than graphical techniques, the AIC provides
one of the only diagnostic tools that can be used to compare non-nested parametric models,
such as the ones considered above. As shown in Table 5, the Weibull model has the lowest
AIC and the log likelihood that is closest to zero. I continue the analysis with the Weibull
model with time-varying covariates. This model also includes unobserved heterogenetiy with
a Frailty Gamma distribution. The alternative is to impose Inverse Gaussian distribution;
that also generates similar results.
The Weibull results are presented in Table 6. Medium erosion areas experience higher
probability of a SCD formation than low erosion areas. Being adjacent to extension service
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has no significant impact. More farmed areas experience higher probability of having a SCD.
Counties facing more crop failure have a higher probability of forming a SCD. County-level
shelterbelt plantation has no significant impact. There is a lower chance of having a SCD in
month the if proportion of operators that is white is high. Following our hypotheses,
counties with high proportion of irrigated land have a lower probability of having a SCD.
Irrigation is a substitute of soil conservation activities. Population density, total number of
farms or average farm size have no significant impact. Places with more tenant-run farms are
less likely to develop a SCD. Counties with higher drought intensity have a higher
probability to create a SCD.
The Weibull model is restrictive, so I estimate the duration model with a more flexible
Cox proportional hazard model. Cox PH does not have any assumption on the baseline
hazard. The results without unobserved heterogeneity are presented in Table 7. On average,
medium erosion areas experience lower probability of a SCD formation than high erosion
areas. Also, this shows being adjacent to extension service has higher probability to create a
SCD. More farmed areas experience lower probability of having a SCD. We also get counties
facing more crop failure have a lower probability to form a SCD. County-level shelterbelt
plantation has no significant impact. There is a higher chance of having a SCD at any month
if proportion of white operators is high. Counties with higher drought intensity have a lower
probability to create a SCD.
We can see that these results are very different from the Weibull Model with Gamma
frailty. One issue may arise in this continuous Cox-PH model is that we cannot estimate the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity. For that purpose, I estimate the full model with
discrete proportional hazard model where duration is measured in years. I reconstruct the
data with annual formation date, and take log(t) as duration dependence. The results are
presented in Table 8. The model shows that medium erosion areas experience lower
probability than low erosion areas to create a SCD but high erosion areas have higher
probability. Areas with higher proportion of farmland have a higher probability, areas with
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more cropland failure also have a higher probability. Both of these follow our hypotheses.
Areas with higher number of farms have a lower probability to create a SCD. This also
follows from the general hypotheses regarding transaction cost. Increasing number of farms
in a county cannot coordinate easily. Higher number of tenants have a lower probability to
create a SCD. Given all these estimation results, discrete Cox-PH model with unobserved
heterogeneity fits better with our conceptual hypotheses.
4.7 Conclusion
Libecap and Hansen addressed wind erosion in the Great Plains as a common-pool
resource problem and also mentions that the externality problem has partly been solved by
the creation of soil conservation districts (Hansen and Libecap, 2004). Several other
narratives also mentioned that SCDs are a major instrument for farmland conservation
(Morgan, 2013). However, detailed analysis on the SCDs have not been done because of data
limitation. This paper constructs primary data on SCDs, and explores the underlying factors
that can influence this formation. I find that farm characteristics and erosion level make
people cooperate earlier. I find drought intensity forces people to take decision on adoption.
However, access to extension service has little effect on the formation.
Coasian bargaining model predictions have long been proven to have issues regarding
common-pool resource management. However, it has been difficult to empirically examine
how variations in the ground variables may affect collective action. This paper contributes to
this literature by providing empirical evidence on relative importance of different covariates.
Results find that SCDs did rise up more rapidly in places hit hardest by crop failure, but
institutional change was slower in areas dominated by farms managed by tenants who did
not have legal authority to help create SCDs to help preserve their farms.
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4.8 Figures
Figure (4.1) Study Area: The Great Plains
Note: In the current version of the paper, six states are included: Nebraska, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming and Kansas.
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Figure (4.2) Montana
Note: Data collected from the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation. Re-
trieved from: http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/cardd/conservation-districts. Montana has 58
conservation districts as political subdivisions (and 56 counties).
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Figure (4.3) North Dakota
Note: Data collected from the Department of Natural Resources and Conserva-
tion. Retrieved from: https://www.ag.ndsu.edu/ndssc/state-soil-conservation-committee/
map-of-soil-conservation-districts. North Dakota conservation districts overlap with the
county borders.
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Figure (4.4) South Dakota




Note: Data collected from the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation.
Retrieved from: https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/division-of-conservation/
conservation-districts. Across the state, 105 Conservation Districts (one in every county)
provide local leadership by helping local people address local natural resource needs.
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Figure (4.6) Wyoming
Note: Data collected from the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation. Retrieved
from: http://www.conservewy.com/. Across the state, 34 Conservation Districts provide
local leadership by helping local people address local natural resource needs.
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Figure (4.7) Nebraska
Note: Data collected from the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation. Retrieved
from: https://www.nrdnet.org/programs. In my study period, Nebraska had one district in
one county in our study period.
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Figure (4.8) Soil Conservation District: Conservation Plan
Note: Data collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation Districts. This shows the
county planning map for a random county in Nebraska. This map shows there is significant
spatial heterogeneity in the farm conservation plan.
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Figure (4.9) Distribution of Formation Month and Year
Note: Formation month and year has been extracted from the annual reports of Soil Conser-
vation Districts in the study area.
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Figure (4.10) State Policy to Event Duration
Note: Formation year has been extracted from the annual reports of Soil Conservation
Districts in the study area. We will use this for the discrete choice Cox PH models.
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Figure (4.11) Proportion of Area: Crop Failure
Note: Data from USDA agricultural census 1935. Shows the proportion of area under crop
failure in 1934.
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Figure (4.12) Policy to Referendum Distribution
Note: Data on formation and referendum collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation
Districts.
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Figure (4.13) Distribution of Policy to Formation
Note: Data on formation and referendum collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation
Districts.
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Note: Data collected from Hornbeck, 2012
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Note: Data collected from Hornbeck, 2012
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Distribution of Medium Erosion
Note: Data collected from Hornbeck, 2012
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Figure (4.17) Distribution of Crop Failure in 1935
Note: Data collected from 1935 agricultural census.
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Figure (4.18) Survivor Function by State
Note: Data manually collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation Districts deposited
in the National Archives and Records Administration. This data covers 1936 to 1957 formation
of the SCDs.
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Figure (4.19) Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function
Note: Data manually collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation Districts deposited
in the National Archives and Records Administration. This data covers 1936 to 1957 formation
of the SCDs.
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Figure (4.20) Kaplan Meier Failure Function
Note: Data manually collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation Districts deposited
in the National Archives and Records Administration. This data covers 1936 to 1957 formation
of the SCDs.
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Figure (4.21) Cumulatative Hazard Estimate
Note: Data manually collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation Districts deposited
in the National Archives and Records Administration. This data covers 1936 to 1957 formation
of the SCDs.
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Figure (4.22) Hazard Function
Note: Data manually collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation Districts deposited
in the National Archives and Records Administration. This data covers 1936 to 1957 formation
of the SCDs.
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Figure (4.23) Baseline Hazard
Note: Data manually collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation Districts deposited
in the National Archives and Records Administration. This data covers 1936 to 1957 formation
of the SCDs.
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Figure (4.24) Cumulatative Baseline Hazard: Cox Model
Note: Data manually collected from the annual reports of Soil Conservation Districts deposited
in the National Archives and Records Administration. This data covers 1936 to 1957 formation
of the SCDs. Cox model can be compared with the Kaplan-Meier model to see the variations.
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4.9 Tables
Table (4.1) Timeline: Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act
1936 Federal Law "Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act"
1937 Kansas, North Dakota, Nebraska, South Dakota
1939 Montana
1941 Wyoming
t > 1941 Formation of Districts continues
Manually collected
Summary statistics is available in Table 2. In the duration analysis we will try to
explore if this variation can explain the duration gap.
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Table (4.2) Description of the Variables used in Duration Analysis
Variable Name Description Data Source
SCD Time Year, Date, Month SCD Annual Reports
SCD Size Initial size SCD Annual Reports
SCD Location Location in the county SCD Annual Reports
Tenancy Percentage of Tenants Agricultural Census
Landowners Proportion of landown-
ers
Agricultural Census
Proportion Black Farms Black Farms/Total
Farms
Agricultural Census
Proportion White Farms White Farms/Total
Farms
Agricultural Census
Farm size Average farm size Agricultural Census
Number of Farms Total Number of Farms Agricultural Census
Population Density Population/acre Agricultural Census
Railway Indication of railway ex-
istence
Agricultural Census
Woodland Acres under woodland Agricultural Census
Soil Erosion Soil Erosion Index Reconnaissance Erosion Sur-
vey (Hornbeck (2012))
Precipitation Precipitation level PRISM (Monthly)
Temperature Temperature level PRISM (Monthly)
Shelterbelt plantation area Acreage, Own collec-
tion
Kansas Regional Archives
Distance to the Land Grant Colleges Own Calculation Dummy = 1 if in 100 mile
buffer
a SCD reports are manually collected from RG114 at National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration at College Park.
b A SCD location inside the county is not determined.
c Name of the Land-grant colleges: Montana State University (Gallatin, MT), North Dakota
State University (Fargo, ND), South Dakota State University (Brookings, SD), University


































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table (4.4) Parametric Survival Distribution
Category Total Mean Median Max
N 246
Time at Risk 79.60 85 188
(final) exit time 79.60569 85 188
Failures .975 1 1
Incidence Rate .0122
Survival Time 51(25%) 86(50%) 106(75%)
c Weibull model has lowest AIC.
Table (4.5) Parametric Survival Distribution
Distribution Survivor Function Parametrization AIC
Exponential exp(−λjtj) λj = exp(xjβ) 568.008
Weibull exp(−λjtρj ) λj = exp(xjβ) 394.11526
Lognormal 1 - [ψ log(tj)−µj
σ
] µj = xjβ 477.2707
Loglogistic [1 + (λjtj)
1
γ ]−1 λj = exp(−xjβ) 451.89144
c Weibull model has lowest AIC.
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Table (4.6) Parametric Duration Model: Weibull Model
(1)







Proportion of Land in Farms 0.0040
(0.001)
Proportion of Cropland Failed 0.5121
(0.018)
Shelterbelt Total Plant 0.0002
(0.585)
Proportion of White Operators -0.1976
(0.002)



















a Data extracted from SCD Annual Reports, USDA agricultural census.
Column shows probability of creating a SCD with Weibull parametric
regression (time varying factors using Gamma Frailty distribution).
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Table (4.7) Non-Parametric Duration Model: Continuous Cox PH Model
(1)







Proportion of Land in Farms -0.0152
(0.006)
Proportion of Cropland Failed -2.1334
(0.031)
Shelterbelt Total Plant -0.0002
(0.851)
Proportion of White Operators 0.9500
(0.002)
















a Data extracted from SCD Annual Reports, USDA agricultural cen-
sus. Column shows probability of creating a SCD with continuous
Cox Proportional Hazard regression (time varying factors).
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Table (4.8) Discrete Cox PH Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity
(1)







Proportion of Land in Farms .0026447
(0.146)
Proportion of Cropland Failed .1098137
(0.890)
Shelterbelt Total Plant .000644
(0.556)
Proportion of White Operators .0627148
(0.699)
Proportion of Irrigated Land -2.8911
(0.388)




Percent of Farms under Tenants -.6527
( 0.081)





a Data extracted from SCD Annual Reports, USDA agricultural
census. Column shows probability of creating a SCD with discrete




This dissertation explores how land conservation policies and local institutions impact
economic development. I find that land conservation policies negatively affect household
welfare in the short term in developing countries but helps to gain forest cover. I also find
that there is a persistent (and immediate) effect of land conservation in the Great Plains of
the USA. However, economic pressure in the conservation site selection creates a long-term
ecological heterogeneity. Finally, I describe and explain the evolution of a local
environmental institution in the Great Plains to manage topsoil erosion.
My first dissertation chapter ‘Consequences of Protected Areas for Forest Extraction
and Time Allocation: Evidence from Nepal’ has policy implications for the design of land
conservation instruments in any developing country setting. First, the results show that PAs
can result in a reduced forest-good collection without necessarily having a significant adverse
effect on total household consumption. However, the measure of total household
consumption may not reveal some actual negative consequences of the reduced wood
collection because of the non-monetary nature of the forest good consumption. We find that
households in Nepal are not shifting toward market substitutes for self-harvested wood as
suggested in many theoretical models, a result that may be driven by low access to market
and may yield hardship to families who must make do with less fuel. Efforts to improve
household access to alternative fuel sources and stoves may increase social well-being in
villages near PAs in rural Nepal. Second, more stringent conservation measures can indeed
produce more significant reductions in forest exploitation. Results in this paper suggest that
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the strict PAs provide more significant reductions in forest degradation than more lenient
buffer zones. Third, planners should not assume that PAs will attract ecotourism that will
immediately make local people better off; we find no evidence of that occurring in Nepal. It
is possible that these results are Nepal-specific and cannot be generalized to other situations
with different political economies of forest management. However, disentangling the direct
impacts and market consequences of PAs is particularly crucial in light of IUCN’s recent
advocacy of the Payment for Ecosystem Services in Nepal.
In my second chapter “Recovery from the Dust Bowl: Implication of Land Conservation
Programs in the Great Plains,” I study the crop-based early conservation policies to
understand the impacts of supply-control motivated conservation policies on environmental
quality. Farmland retirement is an essential and popular conservation instrument and
constitutes a significant portion of the current farmland conservation budget in the United
States of America. For example, the 2018 USA federal budget includes $2.1 billion in
funding for the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) to protect 24 million acres of
environmentally sensitive cropland and grassland (US Congressional Budget Office, 2018).
The impact of farmland retirement on harvest acreage is well documented in the literature;
however, it is not clear how farmland retirement affects land degradation in the long run.
The primary purpose of farmland retirement is to increase the endowment of natural
resources for future benefit. However, market pressure and the use of conservation policy as
a supply control instrument complicate the context. Designing farmland conservation
policies is a massive component in fiscal policies in both the USA and developing countries.
The main concern is that land conservation may not persist after the removal of state-level
subsidies. This study of the USA experience with subsidized conservation programs could
provide insights into likely future effects of land retirement in other regions of the world,
including developing countries. The intensity of the shock that was the Dust Bowl is rare,
but the current world may face similar threats and designing conservation policies in a way
that prioritizes conservation targets is essential.
149
Over the decades, the role of local institutions in solving the collective action problem
has been addressed by different theories with contrasting implications and structural
hypotheses. This established theoretical or descriptive literature cannot predict when people
can create local institutions because of a lack of empirical evidence, but there is a specific set
of variables that have received scholarly attention. My third chapter, “Understanding the
Formation of Local Institutions: Historical Evidence from Soil Conservation Districts,”
contributes to this literature by providing empirical evidence on the relative importance of
different factors. Findings of this paper can mainly be used in two dimensions to design
conservation policies: first, knowledge about the spatial heterogeneity in formation may be
used to design better policies to nudge landowners, second, the micro-level variations in the
farm characteristics may help to understand the distributional consequences of any local
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Table (A.3) Persistent Impact of AAA Expenditure on Grassland





































a Note: Regression coefficients from equation 1. Extracted from regressing log
of proportion of grassland area in any county in 1938-1980 on the county-
level AAA grants at different point of time. Grassland data extracted from
Historical Land Use and Land Cover Database created by USGS. AAA data
extracted from Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2006.
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Table (A.4) Persistent Impact of AAA Expenditure on Cropland Erosion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Log(AAA) 0.0301 0.0302 0.00769 0.00617 -0.0183 -0.0282 -0.0745***
(0.0241) (0.0228) (0.0237) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0234) (0.0246)
Constant 1.056*** 1.031*** 1.222*** 1.096*** 1.422*** 1.579*** 2.180***
(0.314) (0.298) (0.309) (0.291) (0.292) (0.306) (0.321)
Observations 789 791 790 787 788 787 786
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.012
IV -0.237*** -0.194*** -0.195*** -0.164*** -0.209*** -0.206*** -0.261***
(0.0383) (0.0358) (0.0357) (0.0333) (0.0337) (0.0350) (0.0367)
Constant 4.516*** 3.944*** 3.861*** 3.311*** 3.895*** 3.885*** 4.599***
(0.499) (0.466) (0.465) (0.434) (0.439) (0.456) (0.478)
Observations 789 791 790 787 788 787 786
R-squared -0.154 -0.120 -0.093 -0.075 -0.091 -0.071 -0.061
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Regression coefficients from equation 1. Extracted from regressing log of erosion area under cropland in any
county in 1982-2012 on the county-level AAA grants at different point of time. Targeted Crop Intensity is used as
the Instrumental Variable. Regressions are weighted by area under farmland in 1930. Erosion Database created
by USDA NRCS. AAA data extracted from Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2006.
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Table (A.5) Persistent Impact of AAA Expenditure on Pastureland Erosion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Log(AAA) -0.154*** -0.125*** -0.118*** -0.0975*** -0.124*** -0.174*** -0.221***
(0.0193) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0147) (0.0182) (0.0224) (0.0237)
Constant 2.403*** 1.975*** 1.869*** 1.535*** 2.001*** 2.794*** 3.476***
(0.252) (0.224) (0.223) (0.192) (0.238) (0.293) (0.310)
Observations 681 690 699 701 737 750 771
R-squared 0.085 0.071 0.064 0.059 0.059 0.075 0.102
IV -0.218*** -0.205*** -0.188*** -0.141*** -0.230*** -0.301*** -0.375***
(0.0281) (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0215) (0.0271) (0.0333) (0.0354)
Constant 3.235*** 3.012*** 2.776*** 2.103*** 3.384*** 4.444*** 5.488***
(0.365) (0.333) (0.330) (0.281) (0.353) (0.435) (0.463)
Observations 681 690 699 701 737 750 771
R-squared 0.070 0.041 0.042 0.047 0.015 0.035 0.052
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Note: Regression coefficients from equation 1. Extracted from regressing log of erosion area under
cropland in any county in 1982-2012 on the county-level AAA grants at different point of time.
Targeted Crop Intensity is used as the Instrumental Variable. Regressions are weighted by area
under farmland in 1930. Erosion Database created by USDA NRCS. AAA data extracted from
Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2006.
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A2. Additional Figures
Figure (A.1) Rate of Payment per acre in Oklahoma
Note: In accordance with the order respecting Payments under the 1936 Agri- cultural
Conservation Program in the Southern Region, approved by the Secretrry of Agriculture,
October 7, 1936, 90 percent of the county average rates of payment per acre quoted in is
to be used in determining the first distribution of payments for diversion from the general
soil-depleting base to soil-conserving crops.
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Figure (A.2) Rate of Payment per acre in Oklahoma
Note: In accordance with the order respecting Payments under the 1936 Agri- cultural
Conservation Program in the Southern Region, approved by the Secretrry of Agriculture,
October 7, 1936, 90 percent of the county average rates of payment per acre quoted in is
to be used in determining the first distribution of payments for diversion from the general
soil-depleting base to soil-conserving crops.
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Figure (A.3) World Price Variation by Commodities
Note: World Price Variation by Commodities, Data from Jacks, D. (2013), “From Boom to
Bust: A Typology of Real Commodity Prices in the Long Run”, NBER Working Paper 18874;
Base Year = 1900
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Figure (A.4) Aggregate Changes on the Plains in Agriculture (Fraction of Harvested Land)
Data are from the US Census of Agriculture. Each panel reports values aggregated in each
period for the counties mapped in Figure 2. Panel A reports fraction of total harvested land
in cotton; Panel B reports fraction of total harvested land in corn, Panel C reports fraction
of total harvested land in wheat, Panel D reports fraction of total harvested land in peanut,
Panel E reports fraction of total harvested land in rice, Panel F reports fraction of total
harvested land in tobacco.
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Figure (A.5) Aggregate Changes on the Plains in Agriculture
Data are from the US Census of Agriculture. Graph reports the log total harvested land
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Figure (A.6) Soil Conservation Expenditures by USDA Agencies ($2009)
Note: This graph denotes the total financial expenditure on soil conservation by USDA Soil
Conservation Service (currently named as Natural Resource and Conservation Service)
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Figure (A.7) Potential Agro-Climatic Yield
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Figure (A.8) Mean Palmer Drought Severity Index: The Great Plains
(a) January (b) February
(c) March (d) April
(e) May (f) June
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Figure (A.9) Mean Palmer Drought Severity Index: The Great Plains
(a) July (b) August
(c) September (d) October








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Across the United States, nearly 3,000 conservation districts work directly with landowners
to conserve and promote healthy soils, water, forests and wildlife. Conservation districts may
go by different names—”soil and water conservation districts,” “resource conservation
districts,” “natural resource districts” and “land conservation committees”—but they all share
a single mission: to coordinate assistance from all available sources—public and private, local,
state and federal—to develop locally-driven solutions to natural resources concerns. Because
conservation districts are established under state law (A Standard State Soil Conservation
Districts Law), they are often referred to differently depending on where they are located.
In the early 1930’s, along with the greatest depression this nation ever experienced,
came an equally unparalleled ecological disaster known as the Dust Bowl. Following a severe
and sustained drought in the Great Plains, the region’s soil began to erode and blow away;
creating huge black dust storms that blotted out the sun and swallowed the countryside. On
Capitol Hill, while testifying about the erosion problem, soil scientist Hugh Hammond
Bennett threw back the curtains to reveal a sky blackened by dust. Congress unanimously
passed legislation declaring soil and water conservation a national policy and priority. Since
about three-fourths of the continental United States is privately owned, Congress realized
that only active, voluntary support from landowners would guarantee the success of
conservation work on private land. In 1937, President Roosevelt wrote the governors of all
the states recommending legislation that would allow local landowners to form soil
conservation districts.
Montana
The first conservation districts formed in Sheridan and Wibaux Counties in 1939 and
today, most land in Montana is within a boundary of one of our 58 conservation
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districts.Conservation districts are political subdivisions with broad power and authority
under the law to carry out programs that conserve soil and water, protect streams and rivers,
improve soil health, as well as improve wildlife habitat, improve the tax base, and protect
the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the state. Conservation districts are governed
by a non-paid, nonpartisan board of elected supervisors. If a city falls within a conservation
district boundary, two supervisors are appointed by the city government to represent urban
interests. Funding for operations comes from a small tax levied on real property within the
boundaries of the conservation district. The revenue from the mill levy varies from $2,500 in
less populated counties to over $200,000 in counties with a greater population base. The
majority of conservation district levies generate under $25,000 in revenue. This funding is
inadequate to meet the goals of conservation districts, so they rely heavily on grants and
other creative funding sources.
The 310 Law The Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act, also known as "The
310 Law", is administered by the conservation districts. The purpose of the law is to keep
rivers and streams in as natural or existing condition as possible, to minimize sedimentation
and to recognize beneficial uses. Any individual or corporation proposing construction in a
perennial stream, must apply for a 310 permit through the local conservation district.
Conservation districts in Montana are able to reserve water for future beneficial use.
Currently, 31 conservation districts hold water reservations throughout the Yellowstone,
Little Missouri, and Missouri River basins. Each of these conservation districts administers
its reservation for use by individuals within the district. Applications for reserved water use
can be obtained from the applicable conservation district.Conservation districts work with
schools to develop conservation education curricula and outdoor classrooms by Coordinating
technical and financial assistance, provide teaching aids; and Sponsoring youth conservation
field days and annual camps including Natural Resource Youth Camp, Montana Youth
Range Camp, Montana Range Days and Montana Envirothon. Conservation district
supervisors in 33 counties make up the membership of the Montana Salinity Control
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Association. This internationally recognized organization headquartered in Conrad, Montana
provides expert technical assistance in the reclamation and control of saline seeps in
agricultural areas. What is a saline seep? You may have seen white, powdery-looking spots
in the low areas of fields. These spots are seeps, and they have adverse effects on water
quality, wildlife, agriculture production, and other resources.
In addition, many conservation districts sell trees for conservation plantings, provide
landowner maps, and provide a host of other services for conservation purposes. Watershed
groups are locally led and work on local and regional natural resource management issues on
a river basin or watershed basis. Conservation districts are often instrumental on drawing
people and resources together to assist the development of these groups.
With the rapid increase in subdivided acreages, and the resource issues associated with
these small tracts, conservation districts have recently taken on a new role. Conservation
districts may operate recycling programs, create and maintain interpretive trails, sponsor
water projects, or provide education in natural resource management in an urban setting.
Conservation districts promote voluntary, education and incentive-based approaches to
conservation. Planning and local input is an important aspect to this approach. Many
projects throughout the state are undertaken to demonstrate the latest methods of riparian
management, soil health improvements, water quality improvements, river and stream
restoration, irrigation efficiencies, and range management. In addition, conservation districts
host local conservation education events on the latest farming practices, urban conservation,
weed control, and other current topics.
South Dakota
South Dakota’s conservation districts coordinate assistance from all available
resources—public and private, local, state, and federal—in an effort to develop locally led
solutions to natural resource concerns. Organized over 75 years ago, each of the state’s 69
districts is governed by a board of five supervisors who are elected by the public. They are
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similar to other local units of government such as school boards or counties. In South
Dakota, conservation districts are a sub-division of state government. They provide local
conservation leadership, teach the value of natural resources and encourage conservation
efforts. They implement conservation practices that maintain the health of our air, land,
water, plants and animals. They conserve and restore wetlands that purify water and
provide habitat for birds, fish and numerous other animals. They protect groundwater
resources that provide much of South Dakota’s drinking water. They plant trees and other
land covers, and encourage others to do so, to prevent soil erosion, protect air quality,
provide cover for wildlife and beautify neighborhoods.
Kansas
The 105 Kansas Conservation Districts are political sub-divisions of the state and are
governed by a five-member board of supervisors elected by qualified electors within the
boundaries of each county. Most of the Conservation Districts in the state are housed in the
same USDA building with the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS).The
Conservation District board of supervisors determine local priorities most effective in
controlling erosion or improving water quality based upon critical needs identified within the
county. Financial incentives for land treatment projects are available to landowners through
the Conservation District.
Severe soil erosion problems during the Dust Bowl prompted the passage of the
Conservation District Law by the Kansas legislature in 1937. This legislation lead to the
formation of Conservation Districts in Kansas. The first Conservation District was formed in
Labette County in 1938 and the last, Shawnee County, in 1954. Through the years
additional natural resources conservation challenges have emerged. Across the state, 105
Conservation Districts (one in every county) provide local leadership by helping local people
address local natural resource needs. The Conservation District is the primary local unit of
government responsible for the conservation of soil, water and related natural resources
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within the county boundary. Kansas Conservation Districts are political subdivisions of state
government charged with this vital role. Funding comes from county and state allocations,
with some districts generating funds by providing conservation goods and services.
The Conservation District’s governing board is comprised of five elected local citizens
known as Supervisors. They establish local priorities, set policy and administer
non-regulatory conservation programs during monthly board meetings. The Supervisors,
although serving as public officials, do not draw a salary. Conservation District employee(s)
are hired by the Supervisors to provide day-to-day coordination of District activities.
Each Conservation District has an annual meeting either in January or February where
the public are invited to come listen about the accomplishments of the District and learn
more about the programs offered in the county. Also, an election is conducted for the
position(s) of Supervisor(s) to fill the expired three-year term. In this election, every
qualified elector residing in the county is eligible to vote.
Conservation Districts provide information and education to landowners, schools and
the general public about soil and water conservation issues. Some Districts offer
conservation-related items for sale such as grass seed and trees. Many Districts have
equipment available to rent that promotes conservation by preventing erosion and improving
water quality. This equipment may include grass drills, tree planters and no-till seeders.
Services and activities vary with each Conservation District.
Because Conservation Districts are citizen-directed organizations, they are ideal and
practical partners to coordinate local, state and federal initiatives to protect natural
resources and enhance water quality. In addition to local programs, Conservation Districts
administer the State cost-share programs which provide financial assistance to landowners to
install conservation practices. Conservation District employees work closely with employees
of the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and cooperate with other federal and
state agencies to help protect and conserve natural resources in Kansas.
Conservation Districts work cooperatively with local citizens to solve local conservation
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problems, which in turn benefit the agricultural community and society as a whole.
Additional natural resource conservation challenges continue to emerge even amidst many
conservation improvements.
Wyoming
The Wyoming Association of Conservation Districts provides leadership for the
conservation of Wyoming’s soil and water resources, promotes the control of soil erosion,
promotes and protects the quality of Wyoming’s waters, reduce siltation of stream channels
and reservoirs, promote wise use of Wyoming’s water, and all other natural resources,
preserve and enhance wildlife habitat, protect the tax base and promote the health, safety
and general welfare of the citizens of this state through a responsible conservation ethic.
During the 1930’s, the Dust Bowl made the need to conserve natural resources,
particularly soil, very clear. Agencies ranging from Land Grant Universities to the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration researched and implemented conservation practices
throughout the nation. Eventually, the Soil Conservation Service, now named Natural
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) was created under the Soil Conservation Act of
1935, to develop and implement soil erosion control programs.
Sometimes agencies working with conservation ended up competing with each other.
Local leadership was needed to coordinate their efforts and tie them into local conditions and
priorities. Because of this, the President developed a model Conservation District Law, for
consideration by state governments. In March 1941, the State Legislature passed an enabling
act, which established conservation districts in Wyoming. Conservation districts were to
direct programs protecting local renewable natural resources. Wyoming now has 34
conservation districts in 23 counties.
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Nebraska
In 1939, an Interim Legislative Council Study Committee studied the problem of
multiplicity of special purpose districts and found that at that time there were 172 special
purpose water districts in the State of Nebraska. During the period from 1895, when the first
irrigation district was created, to 1967, there were 13 different types of special purpose
resource-related organizations created by the State Legislature.
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